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How NOT to Rebuild a Navy: the case of Romania’s “light corvette” procurement

This report argues that the procurement of a Hisar class offshore patrol vessel (OPV), reclassified by Romania as a “light corvette”^[1], represents a mistake as the ship is not adapted for the naval warfare realities in the Black Sea. Aside from fleet modernization, this procurement was motivated by the need to protect Romania’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from hostile incursions and to fill the gap created by the cancellation of the multirole acquisition program in 2023. The Hisar class OPV is an emergency operational procurement for the Romanian Naval Forces. The report provides a general description of this OPV, discusses the differences between corvettes and OPVs, as well as best suited approaches for the current threat environment in the Black Sea. The analysis sheds light on the type of small surface combatant Romania currently needs in the Black Sea, as well as the political, diplomatic, technical and industrial risks associated with this procurement. By investing in a type of warship that proved vulnerable during the Russian-Ukrainian War in the Black Sea, the Romanian Naval Force prove that they have not internalized the lessons of this conflict. Furthermore, by going ahead with this procurement, Romania stands to gain very little. In fact, Romania is openly undermining its own naval industry which is quite capable of producing similar types of surface combatants.

 

Introduction

On March 28, 2025, the Supreme National Defense Council approved the plans put forward by the Ministry of National Defense to acquire a “light corvette”. The decision came as a surprise, since a year earlier the government cancelled the multirole corvette program started in 2018. Soon after the official communique was released, information began to appear in the press, quoting unnamed government sources, that the Romanian Naval Forces will acquire a corvette from Türkiye.

The “light” corvette Romania wants to acquire is a Hissar class OPV, one of the two ships (Akhisar and Koçhisar) set for commissioning in the Turkish Navy in 2025.^[2] These ships are a derivative of the Ada-class corvette program which delivered multirole corvettes to Türkiye, Pakistan, Malaysia and Ukraine. It appears that Bucharest will receive the first ship of the class, Akhisar. According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defense (MoND), the cost of the program was initially projected to be € 265 million in total.^[3] However, the lump sum for Romanian modifications and/or upgrades has been increased from € 35 million to € 42 million.^[4] Furthermore, the ship will be taken into a Romanian shipyard in order to install the specific equipment requested by the Romanian Naval Forces. The procurement is subject to parliamentary assent, and the ship should be delivered in approximately 6 months after the program gets legislative approval.^[5]

The procurement is meant to fill the capability gap created by the failure of the multirole corvette program, to rejuvenate the fleet with the aid of a new ship and to protect Romania’s interests in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as the production stage of the Neptune Deep gas project begins in 2027.

In many respects, this decision was not a surprise. Former defense minister Anghel Tîlvăr visited two Turkish shipyards in 2024, discussing the possibility of Turkish naval industry to contribute to the modernization of the Romanian Naval Forces.^[6] Indeed, Romania’s Naval Forces are facing capability and technological gaps. These capability gaps affect the ability of the Romanian Naval Force to protect Romania’s EEZ, where gas is going to be extracted from the Neptune Deep perimeter as well as the underwater and above water infrastructure.

 

Corvette vs. OPV

The missions and definitions of naval surface combatants have evolved over time and there is a lot of leeway for governments in how they define a warship.

A corvette is a small warship, smaller than a frigate used for patrol and escort duties. Corvettes are compact and less heavily armed than frigates and, usually, designed for littoral operations rather than the open seas.^[7] Although lately, with the general increase in size of surface combatants, corvettes can handle the open seas much better. Modern corvettes can be specialized in certain types of naval warfare: anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or can be multirole.^[8] A corvette is potentially the smallest surface combatant that can be integrated into a surface action group (SAG) as it is the smallest credible warfighting asset.^[9]

In modern navies, corvettes were usually ships with a displacement between 1,000 and 2,000 tons. Sometimes smaller ships, such as fast attack craft (FAC) were classified as corvettes. However, over the past decade the displacement of a corvette has slowly increased over 2,000 tons, as their missions have become more complex. Rather than classify corvettes as “light” or “heavy”^[10], they should be classified as “small” or “large”, according to displacement and the types of mission they are expected to perform. If one considers the Hisar class OPV as a corvette, solely based on its displacement, then it is about average, being similar with the Gowind and Sigma type corvettes. It is a “generic” corvette built in the 2020s, but with limited firepower.

An Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) is a small warship, designed for coastal defense and protection of a country’s interest in the EEZ. Usual missions include maritime security, border control, anti-smuggling, counter-terrorism, disaster relief.^[11] Sometimes these ships are employed for surveillance and intelligence gathering missions. These are in effect auxiliary warships, that take on missions (both during peacetime and wartime) that are too expensive and time consuming for larger surface combatants to take (corvettes, frigates, destroyers). OPVs are usually built on commercial standards or mixed commercial-military standards in order to be cost effective.^[12] However, this affects their survivability and operational life.

OPVs are relatively slow and are most of the time armed with artillery, rather than sophisticated anti-ship and air defense, although there are exceptions. Their displacement varies, from around 1,000 tons for the smaller ones to 10,000 tons in the case of Chinese and Japanese OPVs.^[13] Some large icebreakers, such the American, Canadian, Chinese and Russian ones fulfill the roles of OPVs in the Arctic. OPVs are mostly used by coast guards, but sometimes can be found in regular navies.

The main task of an OPV is to ensure naval presence in the EEZ, therefore endurance rather than speed and firepower are the main features. The larger OPV usually have a landing deck and hangar for a helicopter. In many respects, an OPV is an auxiliary surface combatant. As such, in order to survive high intensity combat or in a high threat environment, it needs to be escorted or at least covered by more capable surface combatants, such as corvettes, frigates or destroyers. The only mission where OPVs and corvettes overlap are that of patrol – corvettes can mount patrols in the EEZ.

By acquiring a “light corvette”, actually an OPV, followed by potentially two more OPVs, Romania hopes to compensate for the failure of the previous corvette program (2023) and buy some time until the European Patrol Corvettes are delivered in 2030s. However, these OPVs are vulnerable in the current threat environment in the Black Sea and do not provide enough deterrence against potential incursions in the EEZ against underwater and above water infrastructure. In many respects, the Romanian Naval Forces are repeating the mistake of many other navies of trying to “fit a quart into a pint pot”^[14] when it comes to the Hisar class procurement, that is of trying to do more with less (in this case, giving a certain type of ship a role that it wasn’t designed to or cannot fulfil adequately).

 

The Black Sea security threat matrix

At present, the Black Sea is a major theater of war between Russia and Ukraine. Since the annexation of Crimea, in February-March 2014, the regional security environment has continuously degraded. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in hopes of a quick victory. Its expectations, however, have been dashed by Ukraine’s brave and innovative resistance. Over the past almost 4 years, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has transformed in a war of attrition in all domains, the Black Sea included. The latest conflict has underscored the many types of threats a surface combatant faces in the Black Sea, among which are:

• Surface threats: The main threats are the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet, especially the newer surface combatants. Russia still maintains the capability to build warships in the shipyards of Crimea. A major threat for any surface ship in the Black Sea is represented by Russian large arsenal of supersonic and subsonic anti-ship sea-skimming missiles that can be launched from surface vessels and from land-based coast defense systems. Russia appears to have deployed the 3M22 Zirkon hypersonic missile aboard the Admiral Grigorovich class guided missile frigates.^[15] The Zircon has been used against Ukrainian targets either launched from ships or from land-based launchers.^[16] Moored contact mines remain a threat to the freedom of navigation for commercial vessels as well as for warships. Both combatants have developed Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), but Ukraine has proved more adept at employing them. USVs have ambushed surface combatants on the high seas, infiltrated and assaulted naval bases and protected anchorages, used for mining harbor entrances and roadsteads and have launched UAVs to strike targets on land. Ukrainian UAVs have been employed in swarms and, at night, to attack and overwhelm Russian surface combatants. Moreover, Ukrainian USVs have employed air-to-air missile as improvised air defenses and have shot down Russian helicopters and fighter jets sent to destroy them.^[17]
• Underwater threats: Russia continues to maintain 4 Kilo class submarines in the Black Sea. These submarines can attack commercial and military vessels with torpedoes and Kalibr anti-ship missiles (3M54/SS-N-27 Sizzler).^[18] Some of these missiles are super-sonic in their terminal approach to target. The Kilos can strike targets on land with Kalibr land attack cruise missiles (3M14/SS-N-30A) that can hit targets 2,500 km away.^[19] Kilo class submarines can lay mines and deploy naval special forces. These submarines currently represent the greatest naval threat in the Black Sea. The underwater threat in the Black Sea will increase in the near future as both Russia and Ukraine have been developing Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (UUVs).^[20]
• Aerial threats: Despite heavy attrition during the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces and Naval Aviation still poses a major threat to surface vessels and countries in the region. Russian aircraft can strike port-infrastructure, critical infrastructure and military facilities around the Black Sea using cruise missiles, aerobalistic missile (Kh-47M2 Kinzhal/AS-24 Killjoy) and guided munitions, including gliding bombs. Shahed and Geran UAVs have been employed by Russian forces to attack Ukrainian ports on the Danube and the Black Sea on a regular basis. The aerial threat in the Black Sea is compounded by Russia’s deployment of its strategic bombers, equipped with long range cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles.
• Electromagnetic threats: Both sides involved in this war employ electronic warfare to protect their assets in the Black Sea or in support of military activities. Russia has been spoofing and jamming GPS signals in the Black Sea since 2014, and the large-scale invasion of Ukraine has intensified these efforts.^[21]
• Cyberwarfare: Since 2014, both Russia and Ukraine have employed cyberwarfare in order to support their military actions.^[22] Usually, cyberwarfare in the Black Sea has targeted infrastructure assets. However, no instances of cyberattack against a warship has been documented or officially acknowledged.
• Nuclear threats: The Russian Federation is a nuclear power and currently the country with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. President Putin has hinted repeatedly in the past three years at using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, but has not followed through. Tactical systems such as the short-range ballistic missile Iskander-M, the cruise missile Iskander-K, the ship-borne or submarine launched Kalibr missiles and the Kinzhal aeroballistic missile can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Russian defense strategy includes the doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate” which holds that Kremlin will use nuclear weapons in a conventional war if: Russian armed forces are in danger of being defeated, if the security of the state (regime) is threatened or in order to deter a potential conventional response from NATO after invading and/or occupying one of its member states on the Eastern Flank.^[23]

Both countries have targeted and used the offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea for military purposes during the war. Since 2014, Russia has taken over parts of Ukraine’s EEZ off the coast of Crimea which included hydrocarbon resources perimeters and drilling platforms. At present, Kremlin controls the entire coastline of the Azov Sea and plans to occupy the entire Ukrainian coastline to the Black Sea up to the Mouths of the Danube, in a bid to cut off Kyiv’s access to the sea.

Control of Ukraine’s EEZ was instrumental for Russia in order to enforce its blockade of Ukraine’s coastline and interdict its access to the global market. Some of the most intense naval engagements in the Black Sea have taken place in Ukraine’s EEZ. Notably the cruiser Moskva was sunk as it was patrolling Ukraine’s EEZ, enforcing the blockade in April 2022. The battle for control of the Snake Island was one of the longest and intense naval engagement of the war. Russia militarized Ukrainian oil and gas drilling platforms in the Black Sea, deploying radars on them in order to increase its surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities.^[24] Ukrainian special forces and aircraft attacked multiple times these platforms in order to disable the military asset deployed on them or neutralize Russian troops.

 

What ship is best in the current Black Sea security environment?

Looking at the threat matrix in the Black Sea, the general security environment and Romania’s interest in protecting its EEZ and the sea lanes of communications, the obvious question arises: what sort of surface combatant is better suited to protect and promote the country’s interest on the day-to-day basis in the Black Sea? An OPV or a corvette? Why not a frigate?

The answer is not a simple one and it does not involve necessary a single type of naval surface combatant. Romania needs an integrated system for surveilling its littoral, its EEZ and to protect the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) from interference by Russia or by any other aggressive power in the Black Sea. Some of the elements for such a system exist and are operational, such as SCOMAR littoral waters surveillance system, or have been already ordered and are waiting delivery: NSM coastal defense missile systems^[25] and Watchkeeper X UAVs.^[26] A network of surface sensors as well as underwater sensor should offer Romania the ability to surveil its territorial waters and EEZ and provide early warning for potential attacks against offshore infrastructure (drilling platforms), underwater infrastructure (gas and oil pipes, communication cables), inshore infrastructure and ports.

Moreover, the effort to protect Romania’s maritime interests in the Black Sea should not be restricted to the Romanian Naval Forces. The main lesson to be drawn from the naval war between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea is that a navy is any military force structure capable of producing kinetic effects in the maritime domain. The protection and promotion of Romania’s naval interests in the Black Sea must be a joint effort, that must involve, at certain levels and in certain instances: the Romanian Land Forces, the Romanian Air Force, the Border Police – Coast Guard, the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) and the Romanian Intelligence Service (the Anti-Terrorist Brigade) (SRI).

For the protection of the EEZ, a mix of high- and lowend forces should be employed. At the high end of the spectrum should be the frigates and the corvettes of the Romanian Naval Forces, the F-16 AM/BM of the Romanian Naval Force, the NSM coastal defense systems, armed high-endurance UAVs and OPVs belonging to the Border Police – Coast Guard. At the low spectrum, fast patrol boats, naval special ops forces, naval helicopters, UAVs and UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles). The employment of these forces depends on the levels of threats affecting the EEZ. The high spectrum is meant for deterrence and combating major threats, while the low-end of the spectrum should be used for deterring and combating asymmetric scenarios. According to the levels of threat and their specific nature, the high-low approach can be mixed, in order to have an effective and decisive response.

In terms of ships needed for protecting Romania’s EEZ on a routine basis, two kinds of ships are needed: a multirole corvette with a displacement of around 3,500 tons and a ship dedicated to drone warfare. The tactical lesson of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the Black Sea as well as the current threat matrix in the region require naval surface combatants with lots of firepower, in order to survive and deter aggression.

A 3,500-ton corvette should be able to carry out two missions: antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and air defense (AAW). While the ASuW mission would be secondary, this can be effectively carried out by having 8 NSM anti-ship missiles on board and a naval helicopter. The large tonnage of such a corvette is required for the sensors and weapons systems, including the electronic warfare systems, necessary to survive and fight in such a high threat environment. Moreover, at 3,500 t displacement there is enough reserve tonnage for significant upgrades and modifications to be added later on, in order to maintain these ships relevant and up to date.

Why concentrate on ASW and AAW capabilities? The remaining Kilo class submarines of the Black Sea Fleet pose a continuous threat to the SLOCs in the Black Sea despite being bottled up in Novorossiysk and to the underwater infrastructure and surface infrastructure in the EEZ. Combating air threats is required because Russia has used Crimea as launching point for Shahed type drones and cruise missiles to strike maritime infrastructure at the mouths of the Danube and other targets in Ukraine. So long as Russia occupies Crimea, there will be an air threat to the ports on the Danube and to the Romanian coast of the Black Sea. Moreover, Russian one-way attack drones launched from Crimea or the Russian-controlled shore of the Black Sea can hit any drilling platform in Romania’s EEZ with little or no warning.

A ship stationed offshore acting as a radar picket and working in conjunction with NATO AWACS aircraft, NATO air police assets and Romanian Air Force can provide increased early warning and deterrence against air attacks directed against Romanian interests in the Black Sea, be they drilling platforms, air and naval bases or port facilities. The use of Crimea and of the Russian controlled shores of the Black Sea as launching pads for drone attacks against Ukraine makes the role of naval radar picket relevant in the current regional security environment. In case of hostilities, a large corvette with air defense capabilities can intercept aircraft, cruise missiles or drones that target Romanian interests either offshore or onshore, lessening the burden on ground-based air defenses and allowing for a more efficient use of air power.

This ship should have between 16 and 32 vertical launch systems (VLS) silos installed, a missile based CIWS rather than a canon based one, 8 state of the art anti-ship missiles, a medium caliber gun (57 mm – 76 mm caliber), one or two automatic cannons (25 mm – 30 mm caliber), lightweight ASW torpedoes, aviation facilities for one medium sized helicopter (10-ton class) and UAVs, integrated electronic warfare system with ECM and ESM capabilities, integration capability to launch UUVs and sensor suit able to detect both conventional air threats, surface threats, underwater threats, USVs and UAVs. With a displacement of around 3,500-tons, there is enough tonnage for relevant upgrades to keep the ships competitive in the long term, such as for example laser-based close in weapons systems to deal with anti-ship missiles, UAVs and USVs. There have already been developed and tested laser systems that can be used for air-defense on ships as small as a corvette.^[27] Propulsion should be a diesel-electric (CODELOD) with a maximum speed of 28 knots. Range should be around 4,500 nautical miles with an endurance of at least of 21 days.

Concerning the type of vessels required for protecting Romania’s maritime interests in the Black Sea there are some good news. The type of vessel envisioned here already exists in some form or is going to exist in the near future. One example is the Royal Navy’s HMS Stirling Castle, a civilian ship re-purposed for mine warfare and as “mother-ship” for USV and UUVs for securing submarine cables and underwater pipelines.^[28] A ship designed from the ground up as a drone mother-ship would likely be more capable.

Between 2018 and 2023, Fincantieri has built 4 large air defense corvettes for the Qatari Navy. The Al Zubarah class (Doha class) corvettes are capable multirole surface combatants designed mostly for AAW and ASuW warfare, with some ASW capabilities.^[29] The main anti-aircraft armament are 16 long range Aster-30 anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missiles, complemented by a RIM-116 RAM missile-based CIWS with 21 rounds.^[30] For Romania, the integrated air-defense system aboard the Al Zubarah class may be too much, but the Aster-30 missiles could be replaced by 16 Mk 41 VLS silos with 64 RIM-162 ESSM missiles, which would confer a potent local air defense capability in the Black Sea.

Such an armament scheme is possible because the Sylver VLS system used by these corvettes is similar in dimensions with the Mk 41 VLS. Furthermore, Fincantieri owns two shipyards in Romania, in Brăila and Tulcea and has participated in the cancelled 2018 corvette program.

The only downside to a potential procurement by the Romanian Naval Forces of an Al Zubarah class derivative is the need for investment in these two shipyards in order to get them ready to build military vessels. Until now, both shipyards have built complex civilian vessels, but not warships.

 

Official justifications for the “light corvette” acquisition

The official reasoning regarding Romania’s acquisition of a Hisar class OPV is that the ship is needed to patrol the country’s EEZ. Explicitly, the Romanian authorities have linked the acquisition with the need to provide protection for the Neptune Deep gas perimeter^[31] which is set to begin production in 2027.^[32] As such, Romania requires new ships or, at least, a ship to ensure the security of Neptune Deep gas perimeter in the Black Sea.

The Russian-Ukrainian war emphasized the importance of protecting states’ EEZs, the sea lanes of communications and the freedom of navigation. In June 2022, after initially taking over Snake Island, two Russian OPVs were spotted inside Romania’s EEZ, close to Ana and Uranus offshore drilling platforms.^[33] The Russian OPVs belonged to the Vasily Bykov class (Project 22160) – see Annex IV for technical specs, and the ships did not actively interfere with the activities of the two Romanian drilling platforms. Furthermore, if Russia takes control of Ukraine’s southern coast, it is unlikely to respect the maritime delineation between Romania’s and Ukraine’s EEZ issued by the International Court of Justice in Hague, since the Kremlin has enacted legislation that does not recognize anymore the legal decisions made by international courts and bodies.^[34] Furthermore, Russia has already taken and claimed control of parts of Ukraine’s EEZ in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.^[35]

The main reason for acquiring a Hisar class for the Romanian Naval Forces, beyond the need for protecting Romania’s EEZ and freedom of navigation, is ship availability and the willingness of the Turkish government to sell it to Romania^[36] at a “good price”.^[37] Officially, the Turkish OPV was selected because procuring and building a similar ship in a Romanian shipyard would have taken two, maybe three years^[38] while the Hisar class ship could be delivered in six months after contract signature.^[39] However, this assessment does not take into consideration the time that the ship will spend in a Romanian shipyard for modifications and retrofits, training of the crew as well as testing before commissioning the ship into the Romanian Naval Forces. Moreover, the explanation that building a similar ship in a Romanian shipyard would not have met the 2027 deadline, when the exploitation of the Neptune Deep gas perimeter should begin, doesn’t hold water. Pakistan ordered 4 Yarmook class corvettes (Damen 2400 and Damen 2600 OPVs) from Damen Galați, which were build and delivered approximately within a year each,^[40] from the keel-laying to commissioning.^[41] If we factor in arming the ships and training of the crews, one or two OPVs should have become operation in 2027, even if ordered in 2025.

The cost of the ship, according to statements made by the Romanian authorities is € 223 million plus another € 42 million for Romanian specific modifications.^[42] Initially, the cost of modifying the vessel for Romanian needs was reported to be estimated at € 35 million euros. This change may reflect equipment and manufacturing costs that the previous estimation did not include.

The program is likely to include offset and technology transfer provisions, as per Romanian legislation, but the details in this case have not been made available. Romania could obtain a license to manufacture Hisar class OPVs or some equipment associated with this class of ships from the Turkish naval industry.

 

Romania’s Failure to Upgrade the 50^th Corvette Squadron^[43]

The acquisition of a single corvette comes after the Romanian government cancelled, in 2024, a procurement program for 4 corvettes,^[44] which, if it had succeeded, would have recapitalized the entire 50^th Corvette Squadron of the Romanian Naval Forces in 7 years. Initially, in order to compensate for the capability gap created by the cancellation of the procurement program, Romania envisioned four alternative measures: deep modernization of the Type 22 frigates, deep modernization of the Tarantul I fast attack craft, procurement of two OPVs and participation in the European Patrol Corvette program.^[45] The potential procurement of a corvette, a year after the cancellation of the entire program, represents the recognition that the measures envisioned by the MoND to compensate for the gap in capabilities have been insufficient and poorly thought out. Moreover, the decision to cancel the 2018 procurement program seems to have been made in haste, without too much consideration.

The emergency procurement of a “light corvette” from an ally that has barely commissioned it into its own navy suggests the dire situation faced by Romania in the Black Sea. Furthermore, it emphasizes the major errors committed in the process of procuring new warships for the Romanian Naval Forces. The mismanagement and poor planning of the 2018 corvette acquisition program have led to a cascade of errors that have left the Romanian Naval Forces with few options concerning the modernization of the 50^th Corvette Squadron.

Initially, in 2016, it was decided to acquire four multirole corvettes built in Romania, through a direct award to Damen Galați shipyard. As part of offset obligations of the shipyard, the two Type 22 frigates in service with the Romanian Naval Forces would have been modernized and upgraded. This program was cancelled in 2017 for, allegedly, not receiving proper parliamentary approval.

In 2018, a new program was approved which called for the procurement of four multirole corvettes through a competitive acquisition process and for the modernization and upgrade of the Type 22 frigates. In 2024, this program was cancelled due to litigation and misunderstanding between the Romanian and French companies that had been declared winners. The government cancelled the multirole corvette program despite Romania having a major conflict near its border in the Black Sea and not having acquired warships for its navy since 2003!

In 2023, Romania joined the PESCO program for the European Patrol Corvette,^[46] which effectively postponed the acquisition of multirole corvettes by ten years as the program will deliver the first ship after 2030. The program for modernizing the Tarantul I fast attack craft (estimated to cost € 375 million)^[47] and the eventual procurement of two OPVs at an estimated cost of € 500 million in the near future represents a waste of precious scarce resources.^[48]

The Tarantuls are 30-year-old obsolete naval platforms of Soviet origin, equipped with Soviet era weapons which should have been retired from service long ago. Moreover, the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Black Sea has proven that fast attack craft are vulnerable and ineffective naval platforms. A more capable variant of the Tarantul class fast attack craft, the Ivanovets (Tarantul III) was sunk by a swarm of Ukrainian USVs in 2024.^[49]

Furthermore, the Russian-Ukrainian war proved that OPVs are vulnerable naval platforms during a high intensity conflict due to their limited warfighting capabilities. Three Russian OPVs have either been sunk or damaged by Ukrainian USVs since the large-scale invasion began.^[50]

In hindsight, Romania should have amended the 2018 procurement for four multirole corvettes, reducing the number of ships to be acquired or should not have cancelled the 2016 program.

Second, the acquisition of only one ship raises a lot of logistical and maintenance questions. The costs of maintaining one ship of a single type, especially if it is not built by the local shipbuilding industry, are usually high. Moreover, with one ship of a kind, availability issues may arise when the ship enters shipyards for routine overhauls. The Turkish Navy has ordered a new batch of Hisar class OPVs from DESAN and Dearsan shipyards, which differs from the current ships in having a silo based vertical launch systems forward of the bridge and a redesigned bridge.^[51] The Turkish Navy expects the second batch of Hisar class OPVs to begin deliveries between 2028-2029.

This development opens the possibility for the Romanian Naval Forces to acquire a second Hisar class OPV, to complement the first and create a minimum viable force of two “light corvettes” to rebuild the 50^th Corvette Squadron. The Turkish defense press has suggested that Romania is likely to acquire a second Hisar class OPV in the near future^[52] as a follow on to the first ship. Romanian authorities have not yet confirmed their intention to acquire a second Hisar class ship. If such a decision is taken, the two ships would create a stop gap solution until the EPC corvettes will eventually be delivered after 2030.

Alternatively, the Turkish procurement schedule for the second batch Hissar class OPVs opens up another option, the potential acquisition of two more ships from Türkiye. Besides the emergency acquisition of the Turkish OPV, Romania plans to acquire two more OPVs in the near future, this time officially classified as OPVs, built in local shipyards. This program is estimated to cost € 500 million,^[53] though initially the Romanian MoND estimated a cost of the program at € 300 million.^[54] Türkiye seems ready to cooperate with the Romanian government and local companies to further build on this procurement.^[55]

Initially, it was rumored that OPV procurement will be realized through a direct award to Damen Galați shipyard,^[56] which has experience in building this type of vessels.^[57] Instead, the new defense minister Ionuț Moșteanu announced that the OPV program will be awarded through a public tender and will be included in the EU funded SAFE program.^[58]

This change in acquisition strategy for the OPV program made by the Romanian government opens the possibility for one of the Turkish shipyards (ASFAT, Dearsan, DESAN) to participate in this tender and even win it. In order to win the tender, any interested Turkish shipyard either will ally itself with a local Romanian shipyard or will buy one. The latter possibility is feasible as Romanian authorities want to sell off Mangalia shipyard, which has been facing financial and management difficulties and Dearsan shipyard has shown interest in acquiring it.^[59] The schedule for the start of the Turkish second phase of the Hissar class program dovetails very well with Romania’s plans to acquire two new OPVs.

 

Discussion of alternatives

Multirole corvette

Romania could choose between two variants of the Gowind corvette (see Annex II for technical specs). This is the type of ship that was selected in 2018 to re-equip the 50^th Corvette Squadron. Considering the French military presence in the country, this remains a viable option for modernizing Romania’s navy.

The first option would be a derivative of the 2,800-ton Bani Yas class corvette built by Naval Group for the United Arab Emirates Navy.^[60] Although it is an under 3,000-ton design the corvette is heavily armed and could be enlarged. The second option would be the Gowind 3100 type corvette, from which the Maharaja Lela class frigates of the Royal Malaysian Navy.^[61] Although both variants of the Gowind type frigate come equipped with only 16 VLS silos, the number of launchers can be increased. The Gowind 3100 type corvette is the most promising as it provides enough displacement for later upgrades and for increased firepower. The largest versions of the Gowind type corvette can be equipped with Aster 30 antiballistic and antiaircraft missiles.^[62]

The second ship design that should be considered is the Reformador class of the Mexican Navy, a derivative of the Sigma10514 design built by Damen. The ARM Benito Juarez, the only ship of the class, is on the lighter side of the spectrum if compared with the previous two ships, with a standard displacement of around 2,600 tons and lighter armament.^[63] It does compensate with a range of around 5,000 nautical miles that the other two types of corvettes.

However, it has two main advantages:

1. the Sigma type corvette/frigate type is a modular, tailored design with increased firepower.
2. it can be built locally at Damen Galați with full access to US and European sensors and weapons systems.

Comparison with other corvettes in service (please, see Annex II for technical details)

Compared to other types of corvettes built over the past decade, Hisar class OPV/ light corvette seems underarmed for its displacement. It is similar more with the Hrabri class of the Bulgarian Navy in terms of weapons carried. The Bulgarian corvette is derived from the German Lürssen OPV 80 design. Romania and Bulgaria chose corvettes derived from OPV designs (basically heavily armed OPVs).

Compared with Sa’ar 6 corvette, another German design, the Hisar class vessel is underarmed. However, the Israeli vessel is not expected to stay too long at sea, compared to an OPV.

Compared with the Gowind class corvette (the Egyptian version), which is closer in displacement with the Turkish design, it is lightly armed for the air defense and antisubmarine missions. Moreover, the Gowind class corvette design may also hold advantages in stealth, as the French naval industry is far more experienced in building stealth ships than the Turkish one, as well as in terms of sensors and combat management systems. In the long run, Romania should have access to the European Patrol Corvette,^[64] which will develop a large corvette based largely on Fincantieri, Naval Group and Navantia designs.^[65] However, deliveries will begin after 2030, potentially even after 2032 provided the program is successful.^[66]

Two large corvettes should be acquired in the near future, instead of the two OPVs. Such a procurement will not affect Romania’s participation in the European Patrol Corvette program, it will actually act as an insurance policy, if the program runs into major delays or is unsuccessful.

 

A drone “mother ship”

The second type of vessels required in the short and medium term is a vessel that can deal with asymmetric threats in the Romania’s EEZ against the surface infrastructure and underwater infrastructure. This vessel should be lightly armed, host a detachment of naval special forces and act as a mother ship for UAVs, USVs and UUVs. Ideally this vessel should have a displacement of around 1,700-2,500 tons, should be armed with a medium gun (57 mm – 76 mm), light automatic cannons (25 mm – 30 mm) and some sort of point air-defense system, preferably a missile-based CIWS system. Air defense capabilities should be enhanced with drone interceptors in order to deal with UAVs targeting the ship or maritime infrastructure. The ship should be able to deploy special forces using small boats and/or even swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV). Ideally the ship should have a well-deck that would facilitate the deployment of USV, UUVs, Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and special forces. The ship could be derived from an existing civilian design used for offshore support operations or from a military vessel – such as a landing craft or OPV.

Aircraft facilities should include a hangar and the ability to deploy a medium size helicopter (10-ton helicopter). A naval helicopter will increase the ship’s capability to surveil the EEZ and act as rapid reaction force. Furthermore, special forces boarding teams can be deployed from a helicopter to secure oil and gas rigs or to board suspicious vessels.

The ability to deploy UUVs and ROVs is important as it allows for protection and inspection of underwater infrastructure (communication cables, oil and gas pipelines). Infrastructure to support combat divers should be included, as a major part of the work of securing Romanian interests in the EEZ would be carried out by them.

In order to fulfill its mission effectively and efficiently, some of the equipment deployed on board should be containerized, modular and tailored for particular missions (such as drone interceptors or UUVs and USVs). The missions of this type of warship should not be limited to Romania’s EEZ and could be used to guard the Mouths of the Danube against infiltrators and raiders.

Finally, why acquire a large corvette and a specialized vessel (a “mother ship” for drones and special forces) when a frigate and an OPV could do the same missions? For geographic and financial reasons, Romania can afford a limited number of guided missile frigates. Frigates should be used as deterrence against aggression in the Black Sea as well as linchpins for local surface task groups.

Large, multirole corvettes should be the naval “workhorses” of the Romanian Naval Forces in the Black Sea, as they are cheaper to operate than frigates, have reasonable firepower, they can be deployed in the Mediterranean Sea as part of EU and NATO task forces and are overall more flexible. OPVs do not have enough firepower, are not as flexible as a dedicated “drone mother-ship” and should be used only by the Border Police – Coast Guard for constabulary duties in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (as part of Romania’s contributions to EU’s Frontex mission).

 

Technical and Industrial Risks

Looking closely at the proposed procurement of the Hisar class “light corvette” a number of questions are being raised regarding the utility of the program and the capabilities provided by this particular naval platform.

The fact that the Turkish OPVs are based on a corvette hull and are built using naval military standards represents an advantage compared to other similar types of ships, but it doesn’t make them necessarily similar to a corvette in capabilities. Furthermore, despite their modularity, the ships cannot effectively deal with the threats that currently characterize the Black Sea maritime security environment.

Before plunging into the discussion on risks, please see the OPV Technical File (Annex I) for the technical specifications of the OPV on which this section builds upon.

Source: https://turdef.com

Overall armament scheme

Hisar class OPVs are built around the concept of Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW) concept which means in practice that naval platforms have the necessary space and tonnage to install additional equipment, sensors and weapons systems, but these will be fitted at a later date, at the discretion of the end-user. This is a practical and economical arrangement for auxiliary ships, such as OPVs, especially during peacetime when not all ships in a fleet need to be heavily armed. However, at present, there is a high intensity war going on in the Black Sea and Romania requires modern naval capabilities to deter incursions and aggression in its exclusive economic zone.

As such, the Romanian Naval Force require naval platforms able to protect themselves and other objectives or other ships from potential aggression as well as to defend the country’s interests in the maritime domain. The FFBNW concept is not viable in the Black Sea in the current security environment, given the threat matrix that dominates the region. Overall, the FFBNW concept represents a half-measure in terms of capabilities, which leads to procuring underequipped ships which are incapable of providing the required level of deterrence and security.

FFBNW is based on a series of assumptions that may turn out to be false in times of crisis and/or war.

First, that it is possible to anticipate the development of a crisis and have time to re-equip the ship accordingly. Considering how fast crises evolve in the current international system as well as the multiplicity and simultaneity of crises currently affecting the international system, this is false.

Second, that the required equipment for increasing the capabilities of a naval platform will be available. Considering the present high demand for defense systems and supply issues affecting defense supply chains, this assumption is manifestly false. In order for this assumption to be true, a country must either produce enough weapons by itself or acquire from the international market enough weapon systems and store them for use in times of crises. Romania is in neither of the two situations.

Finally, FFBNW implies that a ship must be withdrawn from active service in order to enter a shipyard and have the necessary sensors and weapons systems installed and tested. In practice this means creating a short-term capability gap just before or during a crisis situation. Basically, the FFBNW concept is self-defeating in the Romanian security context.

The logistics of the procurement are not very well known. According to available information, after delivery, Romania plans to have the ship enter one of its own shipyards for modifications to its weapons and sensor systems.^[67] This is highly unusual, given the circumstances of the procurement. Turkish shipyards are experienced in installing Western weapons and electronic systems on ships. The work required by Romania should be done in Türkiye and thus accelerate the delivery of the ship – considering the operational emergency which justifies the “corvette’s” procurement. Furthermore, any new work done on the ship afterwards will further push away the commissioning of the ship in Romanian service, as the ship must enter a new testing phase in order to validate the functionality of the newly installed systems and/or upgrades. Considering the increased delivery times of military equipment due to increased global demand and volatile supply chains, the ship could stay in shipyard more than expected, thus cancelling out the availability argument for the procurement. Delays in final delivery could be caused also by technical problems regarding the integration of the combat management system (CMS) with ship’s systems, sensors and weapons.

One of the main problems of the Hisar class, from a Romanian perspective, is the presence of Turkish weapons and sensors. Part of the € 42 million Romania is paying for modifying the ship represents the cost for replacing these systems with Western sourced systems. Some of the Turkish sensors are first generation and their performance in combat scenarios has yet to be tested. In some cases, some of the original Turkish equipment installed on board is at least one generation behind similar systems produced by other NATO countries. Furthermore, some of the Turkish weapon systems installed on board the Hisar class OPV are redundant and would complicate logistics for Romanian Naval Forces, which are already using similar systems, but from different suppliers.

A particular vulnerability of the Hisar class OPV, considering the current Black Sea maritime threat environment, is its weak air defense capabilities. The ship’s main air defense asset are two four-cell missile launchers for the new and confusingly named Turkish designed HISAR short to medium range air-defense missile.^[68] Although this new type of air-defense missile seems to have good performance, the system has not yet been tested operationally and the number of missiles available (only eight) offers a very limited point defense capability against aircraft and missiles. Local area defense is practically out of the question considering the small number of missiles carried. The HISAR-D missile is credited with a range of 40 km and can intercept targets flying up to a height of 15.000 m.^[69]

Furthermore, the installation of HISAR-D missiles aboard Hisar class OPV is not optimal. The HISAR missiles are not installed in a below deck silo such is the case with the Istanbul class frigate, which employs the MIDLAS VLS designed by Türkiye.^[70] Instead, it uses a partially above-deck launcher installed in a mission bay placed amidships. The lack of silo based vertical launch systems (VLS) is a feature shared by the Hisar class OPV with the more capable Ada class corvette, which in Turkish service lacks a VLS. In contrast, the Ukrainian, Malaysian and Pakistani versions of the Ada class corvette are equipped with VLS for CAMM,^[71] Korean K-SAM^[72] and VL MICA missiles.^[73]

On the first two Hisar class OPVs, the HISAR missiles share this space with 8 anti-ship missiles which means that the room for increasing the number of air-defense missiles is limited. Furthermore, by placing the missile launchers amidships, close to the anti-ship missiles, there is a real risk that if the ship receives a hit in the mission bay or in its vicinity, it loses both AAW and ASuW capabilities not to mention that the subsequent explosion or explosions are going to break the ship in half. The next batch of Hisar class OPVs solves this issue by moving the air defense missiles at the bow, behind the 76 mm cannon, but maintains the same number of eight missiles. It appears that in this configuration the number of missiles can be increased.

According to the commander in chief of the naval forces, Vice-Admiral Mihai Panait, in Romanian service, the Hisar class OPV will be equipped with Raytheon RIM-162 ESSM medium range missiles.^[74] RIM-162 ESSM missiles are in service aboard US Navy ships and across a number of NATO navies, including the Turkish navy. The ESSM missiles can be launched from the ship in a similar fashion as the HISSAR missiles by using the Mk-56 launcher^[75] or the older Mk-48 launcher.^[76] These are vertical launchers that are partially installed above deck. The Block 2 ESSM missiles have active radar guidance while the older ESSM variant has semi-active guidance. It is likely Romania will order the Block 2 ESSM in order to equip its Hisar class OPV.

The range of RIM-162 ESSM missiles is in excess of 50 km, but the maximum ceiling is classified. The range of the missile makes it perfect for both local area air defense and point defense missions. ESSM missiles have been used operationally by the US Navy over the past decade and are capable of shooting down aircraft, UAVs and sea skimming anti-ship missiles. On frigates and destroyers these missiles are usually launched from Mk 41 VLS and are usually stored four per silo, greatly increasing firepower. Considering the large-scale employment of ESSM missiles in the Red Sea and in defense of Israel from Houthi cruise missiles and UAVs attack, by the US and its allies, Romania may have to wait more than expected to receive the missiles to equip its new “corvette”.

The choice of ESSM missiles to equip the Romanian Hisar class OPV increases the firepower of the ship, but not by much. It significantly increases its point defense capabilities, but it does not extend to area defense. With only eight missiles on board, these will likely be expended to defend the ship from air and anti-ship missile attack, not to extend the air defense umbrella to other ships or to protect offshore installations. Ideally, a minimum of 16 ESSM launchers with at least 16 missiles should be installed, however this would involve significant ship modifications.

Considering the initial design choices, the Hisar “light corvette” is unlikely to be equipped with full length Mk41 VLS which would allow arming the ship with four missiles per silo. The HISAR-D missiles partially above deck installation suggests that there isn’t enough space below deck to accommodate full length Mk 41 VLS silos that can hold up to four ESSM missiles per launcher. Moreover, with an estimated budget of just € 42 million for Romanian specific modifications which include munitions, sensors and combat management system (CMS), the financial envelope for significantly increasing the ship’s firepower is rather limited. This precludes significant structural modifications that would shift the air-defense launchers from amid-ship to behind the 76 mm cannon, in place of the ASW rocket launcher/anti-surface guided munitions launcher placed in the B-position, which would require serious structural work.

A further peculiarity of the of the Hisar class “light corvette” procurement is the provision for the installation in a local shipyard of the Romanian specific equipment and weapons. The ESSM missiles are going to be delivered and installed in Romania. Normally, this modification should have been made by ASFAT, which has experience in installing ESSM missiles aboard Turkish warships, as it upgraded and modernized the Turkish Navy’s Oliver Hazard Pery frigates with this type of missile.^[77] This work should be done in a Turkish shipyard in order to expedite delivery and avoid potential issues with the installation of the launchers, as Romanian shipyards do not have the required experience to install such sophisticated weapons systems. However, because of the sanctions imposed by the United States in connection with Ankara’s S-400 acquisition, Unites States ceased deliveries of MK 41 VLS and Türkiye was forced to develop its own vertical launching system – MIDLAS.^[78] As such, the technical risks involved with the acquisition of the Hisar class OPV greatly increase.

 

Anti-ship missiles and artillery

For ASuW missions, the Hisar class OPV comes equipped with 8 Turkish designed and produced ATMACA anti-ship missiles. Romania will replace these missiles with Raytheon supplied Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) in order to standardize on a single type of missiles for its surface fleet. The Romanian Naval Forces ordered NSM anti-ship coastal defense systems in 2021 and NSM missiles will be part of the modernization of the Type 22 R frigates and the Tarantul class FACs. However, the delivery of the NSM coastal defense systems seems to be delayed. The first system should have been delivered at the end of 2024.^[79]But, it appears that the coast defense systems and their munitions will be delivered by the end of 2025.^[80] It is likely that subsequent orders of NSM missiles will continue to suffer from delays because of issues regarding supply chains and increased demand for this type of weapon system. There is a real risk that as soon as the procurement is approved by the Romanian parliament and the contract is signed for the acquisition of the “light corvette”, the commissioning date of the ship in the Romanian Naval Forces will be delayed due to the late delivery of anti-ship missiles or the ship will be commissioned without the NSM missiles (to be fitted at a later date).

Artillery is generally the main armament of OPVs and, on paper, the Hisar class is on par with current trends in arming this type of surface combatant. It has a medium caliber gun and two heavy machine guns in remotely operated weapon stations. Optionally, a cannon-based CIWS can be installed aft, over the helicopter hangar. However, a closer look reveals two characteristics: all systems are of Turkish origin and design, and some are at least a generation behind similar systems deployed by other NATO member states.

The main gun is the MKE 76 mm gun, developed by the Turkish defense industry because in order to avoid the risks of embargoes and late deliveries of similar systems.^[81] In 2019, Italy imposed an embargo on deliveries of weapons^[82] and the development of this particular weapon system began around 2020.^[83] Visually, the MKE 76 mm gun is similar with Oto Melara 76 mm Super Rapid naval cannon which, in the past 50 years, has become a sort of naval standard in Western navies. However, with a rate of fire of only 80 rounds/minute it is similar with the earlier version of the Italian weapon system, built in the 1970s and 1980s, the Oto Melara Compatto which could not intercept anti-ship missiles.^[84] The 80 rounds/minute rate of fire of the Turkish cannon doesn’t allow for the interception of incoming anti-ship missiles and as such greatly reduces its role in protecting the ship from air threats. In fact, the gun was partially developed in order to replace the rather large number of Oto Melara Compatto already in service with the Turkish Navy.^[85]

The Oto Melara Super Rapid has a rate of fire of 120 rounds/minute and was specifically designed to act as long range CIWS against fast flying sea-skimming threats.^[86] The high rate of fire is key to its ability to act as CIWS against anti-ship missiles. In a threat environment dominated by sea-skimming subsonic and supersonic anti-ship missiles, the MKE 76 is likely ineffective. The importance of high rate of fire for a medium naval gun has been demonstrated recently by the interception by a an Italian Horizon class destroyer, Caio Duilio, of one drone with its two Oto Melara 76 mm cannons^[87] and by Bergamini class frigate of a Houthi one-way attack munition in the Red Sea.^[88] The rate of fire of the MKE 76 is markedly inferior to the other Super Rapid competitor on the market, the Bofors Mk 3 57 mm / Mk 110 Mod 0 57 mm, which has a cyclic rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute.^[89] Although this disparity can be explained away by the MKE 76 larger caliber, it underscores the performance differences between the system it tries to supplant in Turkish service.

Considering the limited number of air-defense missiles carried on board by the Hisar class OPV, a 76 mm gun capable to take on eventual “leakers” or to engage air threats than cannot be dealt with by the main antiaircraft warfare system is more than necessary. The Type 22 frigates of the Romanian Naval Forces are equipped with Oto Melara Super Rapid 76/62 automatic guns. Moreover, the three Tarantul class FACs and the two Tetal II class corvettes of the Romanian navy are equipped with Soviet designed AK176 automatic cannons with a rate of fire of 120 rounds/minute, which are capable, at least on paper, of intercepting sea-skimming subsonic anti-ship missiles.^[90]

Compared with the latest western 76 mm naval guns available on the market, the Oto Melara Super Rapid, Strales^[91] and Sovraponte,^[92] the Turkish MKE 76 is at least two technological generations behind. However, for an OPV, who undertakes most of its missions during peacetime and is not designed to be a front-line ship, the MKE 76 is sufficient, though not optimal. The Romanian “light corvette” should be re-equipped with the Strales variant of the Oto Melara 76 mm gun which is designed to deal with supersonic sea-skimming missiles and can fire smart and guided ammunition.

The Hisar class OPV could also be equipped with the Aselsan Gökdeniz 35 mm Close in Weapons System (CIWS) designed to deal with sea skimming anti-ship missiles.^[93] Currently, the Turkish CIWS system is presented as an armament option for the ship as it is not included in the baseline armament configuration. As in the case of the MKE 76 this is a Turkish designed weapons system, derived from the KORKUT self-propelled air defense system.^[94] The KORKUT system is in turn based on the tried and tested Oerlikon Contraves 35 mm GDF-003 anti-aircraft automatic cannon which is produced under license in Türkiye.^[95] However, there are two problems with Gökdeniz CIWS, one tactical, the other technical.

Right now, the tactical picture in the Black Sea is characterized by multiple high-speed threats as well as swarms of armed and/or one-way attack UAVs and USVs. As CIWS, Gökdeniz will act as the last line of defense for the ship if a missile gets passed the main air defense system. However, a gun-based CIWS can only handle only one threat at a time, therefore it can be overwhelmed by multiple air and surface threats. In theory, the MKE 76 mm can handle some of the surface threats, but it may not prove enough in real combat conditions, so the Gökdeniz CIWS (with its high rate of fire and fast response time) will also have to deal with surface threats such as USVs. A missile-based CIWS system such as the RIM-116 Rolling Air Frame Missile (RAM) which can hold 21 infrared and radar emissions guided missiles^[96] is far better suited for the Black Sea threat environment, being capable of handling more than one target at a time.

Furthermore, the US Arleigh Burke class destroyers based in Rota, Spain, tasked with the missile defense of Europe and which have regularly patrolled the Black Sea before Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, had their aft 20 mm Phalanx CIWS replaced with SeaRam, a 11-round launcher for RAM which uses the same sensors and mounting as the Phalanx, in order to deal with the anti-ship missile threat in the region.^[97] The Ada class corvettes of the Turkish Navy, from which the Hisar class ships are derived from, are equipped with the RIM-116 RAM CIWS.^[98]

From a technical point of view, the Gökdeniz is a rather dated system based on the Oerlikon GDF-003 towed anti-aircraft gun. Although a potent weapon, with a firerate of 550 rounds/minute per barrel, the Oerlikon GDF-003 is a 1980s design which is now being replaced by more compact and faster firing 35 mm air defense solutions. As in the case of the ground-based system, the Gökdeniz consists of two 35 mm automatic revolver cannons mounted together with a combined rate of fire of 1,100 rounds/minute. The Turkish CIWS has its own radar and optical sensors that can detect and track air and surface fast moving threats. Aselsan gives a range of 4,000 m for its CIWS which is standard for the Oerlikon GDF-003, but in practice, the engagement of a target begins at shorter ranges. For Romania, the advantage of a 35 mm gun-based CIWS is that it can use locally produced ammunition, which simplifies logistics. Gökdeniz can employ ATOM pre-programmed air-burst ammunition in order to deal with anti-ship missiles, UAVs and small surface targets (USVs).^[99]

Although it is the latest 35×228 mm gun-based CIWS to enter service with the Turkish,^[100] Philippine,^[101] Turkmen^[102] and Ukrainian navies,^[103] it is not the first of its type. It is similar with the South African Denel Dual Purpose Gun,^[104] designed in the early 2000s and deployed by the South African Navy on its frigates.^[105]

The Rheinmetall Millenium Gun GDM-008 with a rate of fire of 1,000 rounds/minute is the latest 35 mm air defense cannon and has been in service with NATO and foreign navies for more than two decades.^[106] The land-based version of the Millenium gun has been successfully combat tested in Ukraine against Russian cruise missiles and UAVs.^[107] This German CIWS can employ AHEAD air-burst pre-programmable ammunition in order to deal effectively with subsonic and supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, UAVs as well surface threats.^[108] Bizarrely, the Romanian Naval Forces wants to acquire Millenium 35 mm CIWS for the upgrade of the two Type 22 frigates.^[109] It, therefore, makes sense that a Millenium system should be installed on Romania’s newest warship, in order to have standardized weapons across the fleet and make the acquisition cost effective.

Overall, a missile-based CIWS such as the RIM-116 RAM is better suited for the Black Sea environment as it can handle multiple threats at once and it can engage them at longer distances than a gun-based CIWS.

Finally, the artillery armament of the Hisar class corvette is topped off with two remotely operated weapons stations for 12,7×99 mm Browning M2 machineguns. Romania is likely to replace the Turkish made weapons stations with locally made Pro Optica Anubis,^[110] which are already installed on Type 22 frigates, in order to standardize on a single system, across the entire fleet. Considering the threat of USVs in the Black Sea and their proliferation, weapons of at least 20 mm caliber that complement the 76 mm gun should be installed to deal with swarms of USVs or small boats similar to Iranian Boghammers. Both Russia and Ukraine are now developing or already fielding USVs armed with rockets and missiles, beyond the usual explosive charge^[111] which requires engagement beyond 500 m. Russian small patrol boats deployed in the Black Sea, surface combatants that are likely to challenge and/or infiltrate Romania’s EEZ, are armored.^[112] Consequently, there is a need for larger caliber weapons, in the 20-30 mm range to deal with this threat.

The artillery and close in weapons systems of the Hisar class OPVs can be supplemented by the mounting of an Aselsan KMC-U missile launcher for small guided munitions or Umtas laser guided anti-tank missiles to deal with USVs swarms.^[113] The missile launcher is placed in the B-position, behind the MKE 76mm cannon and seems to be derived from the Aselsan Tactical Missile System. The launcher can use UMTAS anti-tank missile systems and Cirit guided 70 mm rockets (2.75’’ rockets) to deal with fast moving surface targets. Such a solution will increase the ships protection against surface swarm attacks and increase its firepower.

Alternatively, Romania could choose to equip the ship with a Typhoon Weapons Station developed by the Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems which uses a 20 mm or 30 mm automatic cannon as well as guided munitions, like Spike anti-tank missiles. Such a solution would increase firepower and the ability to deal with small boats and USVs.

For ASW work, the Hisar class OPVs are rather sparsely armed and equipped, but in line with their auxiliary role. The ships are equipped with hull mounted sonar of Turkish origin and a locally designed towed array sonar can be fitted, if desired. For the Turkish Navy, Roketsan has developed a towed array sonar that can be fitted to its ships.^[114] Romania is likely to demand the replacement of these sensors, with sonars of western origin. The Romanian navy has already installed Thales towed sonar arrays on its Type 22 frigates,^[115] as part of a limited modernization program to increase their ASW capabilities. Potentially, the Romanian navy will replace the hull mounted sonar as well, in order to ensure a better integration with a new western sourced system.

 

Anti-Submarine Weapons

In terms of antisubmarine weapons, the Hisar class OPV (in its baseline form) is not equipped with lightweight ASW torpedoes. Two double torpedo launchers for Turkish Orka 324 mm lightweight torpedoes can be fitted, if desired, as part of an optional weapons fit.^[116] The launchers are developed by Aselsan^[117] and the torpedoes have been developed by Roketsan and are NATO standard 324 mm ASW torpedoes.^[118] Although this is a NATO standard weapon system, it is the first-generation Turkish light ASW torpedo, with unknown operational performance. Considering the current operational environment in the Black Sea where the submarine represents the greatest threat for a surface combatant, the lack of ASW torpedoes (as part of the standard weapons ship fit) represents an error. As the Romanian Naval Forces intends to use its Hisar class OPV as a corvette, as a frontline ship, the lack of ASW torpedoes in the baseline weapons fit represents a vulnerability, which limits the capability of this ship to protect itself as well as other ships, if charged to act as an escort.

The Hisar class OPV can be equipped with an anti-submarine six-round rocket launcher placed at the bow,^[119] in the B-position, behind the MKE 76 mm cannon. The launcher uses munitions similar to the ones used by the Soviet RBU 6000 anti-submarine rocket launcher, but of a smaller caliber. ASW rocket launchers are still effective in coastal areas, in shallow waters, where ASW torpedoes might be ineffective or too expensive to use.

It is not very clear if the Romanian Naval Forces will be able to equip its Hisar class OPV with ASW torpedoes. As noted, the budget for Romanian specific weapons is limited. In case Romanian authorities decide to equip the ship with ASW torpedoes, they will likely order Sting Ray torpedoes and launchers from UK or MU90 Impact torpedoes and launchers from EuroTorp.

The main anti-submarine weapon of the Hisar class OPV is the SH-70B naval helicopter. The ship can accommodate one 10-ton naval helicopter for ASW missions according to ASFAT.^[120] In Romanian service, the ship will be equipped either with an IAR-330 Puma Naval helicopter or an Airbus H215M naval helicopter in the future. The Puma Naval helicopter doesn’t provide the same ASW capability as the S-70B, because of its lack of a dipping sonar, but it is equipped with sonobuoys and Sting Ray lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes. Furthermore, the Romanian Naval Forces currently operate only three dedicated Puma Naval ASW helicopters and these are usually embarked on the three frigates of the 53^rd Frigate Flotilla which means that the Hisar “corvette” will have to share in this limited “stock” of naval helicopters. The two H215M helicopters ordered from France which will be delivered in 2029 are dedicated ASuW helicopters, which means that in practice the ASW capability of Romania’s newest surface combatant will be very limited.

 

Aviation facilities

The aviation facilities aboard the ship are in line with those of a corvette, with a landing deck and hangar for 10-ton helicopter and for UAVs. Some modifications may be required to the hangar for the operation of Puma Naval and H215M helicopters. The Romanian Navy will likely make full use of the Hisar class OPV’s ability to deploy UAVs from its deck and hangar. The ship will come equipped with a Bayraktar UAV, potentially a Bayraktar Kalkan vertical take-off and landing UAV.^[121] In Romanian service, the ship will likely also deploy Shield AI MQ-35A V-Bat UAVs^[122] or locally manufactured ones.

 

Combat Management System (CMS)

In keeping with the program purpose to include locally designed technology and weapons systems, the Hisar class is equipped with the Havelsan Advent integrated combat management system (CMS).^[123] It is possible that the Advent CMS is going to be changed by the Romanian Naval Forces in order to facilitate the smooth integration of western weapons systems.^[124] However, it should be noted that the Turkish CMS can integrate Western sourced weapons such as in the case of the Malaysian, Pakistani and Ukrainian Ada class corvettes.^[125] It is likely that Romania will replace the Turkish origin CMS with a similar Western system such as Thales Tacticos, Saab 9LV or Terma C-Flex, CMS that are designed for small surface combatants such as corvettes and fast attack craft. Further changes are likely to be made to the main search radar, fire control radars and infrared sensors according to Romanian specific needs. If Romania chooses a Turkish sourced CMS this will further undermine its local industry, as Thales for example, has an established local presence in the country which spans both the civilian and defense industry.^[126]

Most of the Turkish systems are first generation systems and their operational suitability for the Romanian Naval Forces is unknown. Despite the threat posed by UAVs/UAS and USVs in the Black Sea, the Hisar class doesn’t come equipped with an integrated electronic countermeasures (ECM) suit, only with electronic support measures (ESM) suit for the radars and chaff dispensers.^[127] An integrated ECM and ESM suit can be optionally installed and integrated with the CMS to deal with air and surface threats.

 

Political and Diplomatic Risks

By acquiring a naval vessel from Türkiye, Romania exposes itself to certain political and diplomatic risks, despite Ankara being an ally and strategic partner. These risks have to do mostly with Ankara’s relationship with Moscow, internal developments in Türkiye that may affect its relations with the US and/or the EU and differences over the security of the Black Sea. Türkiye’s relations with Russia should be of particular concern for Romania.

Since the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Romania’s defense relationship with Türkiye has deepened through military acquisitions such as the procurement of 18 Bayraktar TB-2 drones,^[128] acquisition and production of Turkish Cobra II 4×4 armored vehicles,^[129] cooperation for ammunition production^[130] and by the creation, along with Bulgaria, of the MCM Black Sea initiative, to deal with the danger of drifting mines.

In terms of military technical cooperation, Türkiye is attractive for Romania as its defense industry delivers on time^[131] and at a good value for money. The acquisition of the Hisar class OPV by the Romanian Naval Forces is the latest and most significant, in terms of implications, military procurement made by Romania from Türkiye.

For Türkiye, Romania represents an entry point to the European market, especially when it comes to production facilities, as any active joint venture in the country will have access to EU’s defense market. The selection and procurement of the Hisar class OPV by Romania, represents a victory for the Turkish naval industry as Romania is the first NATO and EU country to procure a naval combatant from Türkiye. The EU naval defense market is extremely competitive and the Romanian decision to go with a prestigious Turkish national project (MILGEM), represents a significant industrial and diplomatic achievement which can be used to promote its military more effectively abroad.

However, since 2017 Türkiye has been subject to US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for acquiring Russian S-400 air defense systems.^[132] This can create difficulties with the transfer and integration of complex weapons systems. Some of the changes and modifications that are going to be made to the Hisar class OPV in a Romanian shipyard are due to CAATSA.

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952. Bucharest and Ankara have a strategic partnership since 2011. Turkish armed forces are the second largest in NATO and Ankara is the main NATO ally in the Black Sea.

However, Ankara’s foreign policy has put the country at loggerheads with its traditional Western allies. Taking advantage of its location, at the crossroads between Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Türkiye wants to maximize its global influence in a world that it is more competitive and volatile.^[133]

Türkiye has also been historically involved in disputes with Greece over maritime delimitation and air space sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean,^[134] with the EU over Cyprus unification,^[135] with Cyprus over maritime delimitation,^[136] with France over its latter support for Greece as well as over Turkish involvement in the Libyan civil war and Syrian civil war,^[137] with Israel over the Middle East Peace Process, Palestinian cause and the civil war in Syria,^[138] as well as with Egypt and Israel over maritime delimitation.^[139]

Ankara has been disillusioned by NATO’s response when there was a spillover of the fighting in Syria on its territory,^[140] despite the Alliance deploying Patriot missile batteries on Turkish territory.^[141] Lately, Türkiye delayed the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, over previous disputes with Stockholm and Helsinki over human rights issues and the Kurdish question.

Further tensions between Türkiye and its Western allies developed after the 2016 coup attempt. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suspected that Western countries, especially the United States, knew about the coup plot and failed to inform him. Relations soured when the US refused to extradite the alleged plot mastermind, Fethullah Gülen – who ultimately died in exile, in 2024,^[142] and over the subsequent repression of civil society in Türkiye.^[143]

 

Türkiye exclusion from the F-35 program

The best-known dispute Türkiye has with one of its allies, with overarching political and military effects, is with the United States and involves the procurement from Russia of S-400 Triumf integrated air defense systems.^[144] As a result of this procurement Türkiye was kicked off the F-35 Lightning II fighter program by the United Stated and the fighters already produced for the Turkish Air Force were seized.^[145] Türkiye’s procurement of Russian integrated air defense system was deemed by Washington a risk to the integrity of NATO command and communication systems, if the S-400 system would have been integrated into the Alliance air defense network.^[146] Türkiye exclusion from the F-35 program has affected its aeronautical and defense industry, Ankara hosting an assembly line for the fifth-generation fighter.^[147]

Other similar incidents

Considering these foreign policy disputes and Ankara’s rather unpredictable foreign policy, some Allied countries have reservations concerning the selling, licensing and sharing of sensitive defense technology with Türkiye. Beyond the F-35 program, Germany blocked the selling of Eurofighter Typhoons to Türkiye over human rights and democracy issues.^[148] However, German authorities have rescinded that decision and are ready to sell to Ankara 40 Eurofighters.^[149] Canada restricted the export of sophisticated camera sensors for Bayraktar TB-2 drones, over Türkiye’s incursion into Syria,^[150] however by 2024 these export restrictions have been lifted.^[151]

Beyond the interplay of technology and politics, the reason why Türkiye is developing a potent fleet but also a defense naval industry able to build and arm its ships, are its geostrategic ambitions in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. These ambitions are encapsulated in the Mavi Vatan strategic concept for the maritime space claimed by Türkiye in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.^[152]

 

Türkiye’s relationship with Russia

Türkiye has a particular relationship with Russia, which has been described at times as both cooperative and competitive.^[153] Russia builds a nuclear powerplant for Türkiye,^[154] Ankara imports large quantities of gas from Russia^[155] Russian tourists spend their vacations in Turkish resorts^[156] and Moscow imported millions of tons of Turkish vegetables.^[157] Russia has cultivated Türkiye over the past quarter of century using the economic lever, in order to peel Ankara away from NATO and the US and consequently fragment the Western Alliance.^[158] However, during the Syrian civil war Ankara and Moscow backed different camps and came to blows, such as when Russia’s Sukhoi Su-24 was shot down by the Turkish Airforce while conducting strikes against a faction supported by Ankara.^[159] The incident was resolved diplomatically, but it highlighted the complexities of the Russian-Turkish relationship.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and escalated to the full-scale invasion of 2022, didn’t fundamentally change Türkiye’s rather ambiguous foreign policy towards Russia. These significant security developments may have increased Ankara’s threat perception concerning Russia, especially after using Crimea as a springboard for the 2015 intervention in Syria, but Türkiye refrained from taking decisive action actions against the Kremlin directly. It did, however, chase away, using proxies, Russia from Syria (2024), Libya (2021) and challenged, through Azerbaijan, Moscow’s hegemonic role in the South Caucasus (Azeri-Armenian war of 2020 and the subsequent intermittent border clashes between 2021-2024). These proxy confrontations between Ankara and Moscow took place while maintaining regular diplomatic dialogue between the two states.

Despite the sanctions regime imposed by the US, EU and NATO countries against Moscow, Ankara continues to maintain economic relations,^[160] with some fluctuations because of Western pressure.^[161] Worse, Russian ships carrying stolen Ukrainian goods have traded in Turkish ports.^[162] Turkish companies have refined Russian oil and sold it on the European market.^[163] However, on February 28, 2022, Türkiye closed the straits for military vessels, which precluded Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet with ships from its other fleets.^[164]

Türkiye has used its position as a guardian of the Straits to mediate between Kyiv and Kremlin, with the aim of increasing its regional and global outlook. Türkiye facilitated the negotiations of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in 2022, which ensured continuous access of Ukrainian grains to world markets and food security for North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa until July 2023.^[165] Istanbul has been the venue of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations for the peaceful resolution of the war.

 

Romania and Türkiye: divergent visions for Black Sea security

Despite Romania and Türkiye being members of NATO and having a strategic partnership, there are areas of tension in the bilateral relationship. The most important area of tension has been, ironically, Black Sea security. Bucharest is a proponent of more involvement of outside actors in the Black Sea (US, NATO, EU) in order to stabilize and counterbalance Russia’s aggressive behavior and revisionism. On the other hand, Türkiye is opposed to a larger Western presence in the Black Sea, considering that regional issues should be resolved by regional actors. Before 2014, Ankara sometimes aligned with Russia to block calls and initiatives for greater American and EU involvement in the region.

Turkish foreign policy and military elites have a certain reticence to allow the involvement of outside actors in the Black Sea, especially US and NATO, despite the fact that Türkiye is a full-fledged member of the Alliance which hosts US troops and military assets on its territory. This attitude may be grounded in Türkiye’s complex history with Western powers, that predates the establishment of the Republic. The commander of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Ercüment Tatlıoğlu had this to say regarding US and NATO presence in Black Sea, after the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine:

“As you know, NATO is trying to take some measures in the Black Sea. However, we declare that we will take these measures in the Black Sea ourselves and that we do not want NATO or America in the Black Sea… Our goal is for Montreux to be respected. We have provided security for everyone in the Black Sea. As Turkey, we provide security in the Black Sea. They [the US] should not turn the Black Sea into a Middle East. That is why we do not want any country or NATO to enter the Black Sea…”^[166]

A strange statement given that Turkey is in NATO, so NATO is already in the Black Sea.

In response to the danger of drifting mines caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye have formed a mine clearance initiative called the MCM Black Sea.^[167] Although from an operational point of view, such a regional format makes sense, from a strategic point of view it does not provide the necessary deterrence considering the threat matrix that has been developing in the Black Sea in the past three years. Ankara should have allowed the deployment in the Black Sea of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two (SNMCMG2) to deal with the drifting mines threat. Such a deployment would have demonstrated NATO’s commitment to provide security and deterrence for its allies in the Black Sea and would have guaranteed freedom of navigation. The SNMCMG2 ships could have worked together with Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish ships to protect the sea lanes of communication from the danger of drifting mines as well as other types of naval mines.

The 2022 large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has called into question the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The decision by Ankara to block the access in the Black Sea to Russian warships has aided Ukraine overall, by precluding the access of other Russian ships to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet. However, the interdiction applies to warships belonging to non-riparian states. This means that NATO or US naval warships cannot enter the Black Sea so long as hostilities between Ukraine and Russia continue and as long as Türkiye considers it fit.

However, the injunction against allied ships is based on a very generous interpretation of the Montreux Convention. Russia is clearly the aggressor in the war against Ukraine and overall, a threat to regional stability. NATO’s naval presence in the Black Sea would have contributed to regional security, including Ankara’s. The fact that this situation continues after more than three years since the large-scale hostilities between Russia and Ukraine began, poses a serious threat to the navigation regime in the Black Sea, as it is enshrined in the Montreux Convention. It is also worth remembering that the Montreux Convention was adopted in 1936, long before the UN Charter (1945) and the Washington Treaty (1949). The blanket injunction against military traffic through the Straits should have been employed only as a short-term measure and then rescinded.

 

Franco-Romanian partnership

The political and diplomatic risks associated with such an important military procurement from Türkiye is increased by the letter of intent signed by the Romania’s defense minister and its French counterpart in June 2022^[168] regarding cooperation for the modernization of the Romanian Naval Forces with state-of-the-art equipment. The letter was signed in the larger context of the corvette procurement program, initially won by a French-led industrial alliance between Naval Group and Șantierul Naval Constanța (SNC), a Romanian shipyard. Furthermore, Romania has expressed interest in the procurement of two Scorpéne submarines from France.^[169]

Nothing significant has come from these Franco-Romanian initiatives: the corvette procurement foundered as Naval Group could not reach a final agreement with its Romanian partner. The acquisition of the two Scorpéne submarines has yet to materialize and the letter of intent regarding naval cooperation seems to be, unfortunately, a dead letter. Only the procurement of two H215M naval helicopters for anti-surface warfare (ASuW) has been agreed in 2024,^[170] with deliveries in 2029^[171] which makes the program irrelevant in terms of increasing the aerial capabilities of the Romanian Naval Forces in the near future. Cooperation on mine warfare between the Romanian and French navies is a further result of this letter of intent. Meanwhile, as a result of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, French troops are deployed on Romanian territory to deter a potential aggression against NATO. Romanian officials are likely to face difficult questions regarding the Turkish “light” corvette procurement from their French counterparts, considering France’s security commitment towards the Black Sea region and Romania.

Buying a warship or even two warships from Türkiye (because this acquisition opens the door to another one) can also be interpreted as breaking Romania’s commitments to European defense^[172] at a time when EU is trying to develop not just a defense pillar, but also a defense industry to support it.^[173] Romania has pledged itself to support and develop a European defense industry in order to lessen its dependence on other suppliers. Romania’s acquisition of Turkish made warship may be interpreted as an abdication from this commitment. Other EU member states, with far more developed naval industries, will view Romania critically, if it becomes the gateway for entry of Turkish naval technology into the European Union. Desan Shipyard, a Turkish naval company may acquire a Mangalia shipyard and thus become a European company.^[174] Desan is linked with the Turkish defense industry and is going to build the second batch of Hisar class OPVs for the Turkish Navy.

 

Conclusions

Overall, on paper, the Hisar class is a capable OPV, close in capabilities to a corvette, but not quite a corvette. The baseline ship is not adapted to the current threat environment in the Black Sea region, having insufficient firepower to protect itself or other ships from surface, air and underwaters attacks. Its main vulnerabilities are their poor AAW and ASW capabilities. Their ASuW capabilities are on par with those of a corvette and above those of an OPV. Furthermore, in order to integrate the ship (or ships) with the Romanian Naval Forces modifications to their sensors and weapons systems are required.

This acquisition comes with a number of political, diplomatic and technical risks, that outweigh any potential benefits. The Hisar class procurement program is inadequate for the current threat environment in the Black Sea. This vessel has proven vulnerable in the current Russian-Ukrainian war. Moreover, the procurement of a Turkish built vessel, when similar ships can be built in Romanian shipyards undermines the local naval defense industry.

The Hisar class OPV has been developed by the Turkish state in order to fill an operational gap between locally (nationally) designed corvettes and frigates, to replace A79 Burak class corvettes of French origin which are obsolete and to create a surface combatant equipped with as much Turkish sensors and weapons as possible. Türkiye wants its ships and submarines to be as self-sufficient as possible from foreign suppliers for political and economic reasons. This military self-sufficiency is driven in part by the many diplomatic disputes in which Ankara has involved itself as a result of its assertive foreign policy agenda. These disputes have in some cases affected the country’s access to military technology from abroad.

Acquiring complex weapon systems and naval platforms from a country that, despite being an ally, regularly finds itself at odds with the EU and is still under US sanctions, generates unwanted externalities for the end-user (Romania).

At present, the EU as well as member states independently are taking a closer look at the Black Sea region because of its conflict potential. Therefore, Romania must find the right balance between regional partnerships, European solutions and bilateral relations.

Key take-aways:

• The Hisar class OPV acquisition is an emergency operational requirement procurement that does not provide the necessary deterrence against the threats characterizing the maritime environment of the Black Sea;
• The ship does not have enough firepower to deal with the air and sub-surface threats in the Black Sea. The anti-surface capability of the ship is adequate, but requires some upgrades in the future. Overall, the ship itself does not significantly increase the capabilities of the Romanian Naval Forces.
• The commissioning of the ship in the Romanian Naval Forces service is likely to be affected by the necessary work to adapt the ship to Romanian specific requirements and the delivery of weapons and equipment.
• Romanian authorities have not given enough consideration to the security and naval environment when the decision to acquire the ship has been made. Price, rather than readiness and capabilities, seems to have dictated the procurement. Alternatives should have been considered more seriously.
• Although the Romanian authorities are overselling to the public the warship as a “light corvette”, the ship is clearly an OPV. A very well armed OPV, nevertheless. Romania’s plans to acquire another two OPV risks creating an unbalanced and vulnerable force for patrolling its EEZ and protection of its offshore drilling platforms.
• Romanian authorities chose a type of vessel that requires a lot of work to be done in order for it to be made operational at the standards required by the Romanian Naval Forces. This work is likely to be done in Romanian shipyards that are not yet experienced in installing complex Western weapons systems. The integration of the sensors and weapons systems with the combat management system is going to be challenging.
• Romania has chosen a type of warship created for Turkish specific needs and with a lot of Turkish supplied weapons and sensor systems. Some of these systems may be a generation or two behind Western equivalent systems. The Hisar class was created from the start to include as much Turkish content as possible. In part this solution was chosen because of Ankara’s numerous diplomatic disputes with its Western allies that have led to sanctions being imposed on Türkiye. Part of this content represent first generation Turkish systems, with untested operational performance and unknown reliability. In the future some of these systems will have to be replaced with equivalent Western equipment or more modern one which in turn will increase operational costs.
• Romanian authorities have not given enough thought to finding alternative sources for more capable warships for protecting its EEZ. Solutions could have been found in EU member states, such as Italy or France.
• Romania could have opted for a better armed ship also from the Turkish Navy. It could have opted for one of the Istif class frigates which would have fitted Romania’s schedule for protecting the EEZ and are closer to large corvettes in displacement or one of the original Ada class corvettes already in Turkish service.
• The option for an OPV and the potential creation of an OPV unit within the Romanian Naval Forces shows that the Romanian military decision makers have not learned the lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian naval war in the Black Sea. Russian OPVs have proven to be vulnerable to Ukrainian USV attacks. Investing in OPVs in the current security environment in of the Black Sea is a waste of precious scarce resources.
• By acquiring a Turkish vessel, Romania is undercutting its own naval industry. Considering the emergency operational requirement for protecting the Romanian EEZ, serious talks between government and industry should have taken place for building new ships for the Romanian Naval Forces. The official position – that it would have taken too long for the Romanian naval industry – does not really convince. Solutions for delivering one OPV or corvette before 2027, when the exploitation of the Neptune Deep begins, could have been found. Moreover, the delivery time of the Hisar class OPV to the Romanian Naval Forces may be delayed by the work necessary to modify the ship with the necessary equipment, potential delays in delivery of specific equipment as well as subsequent testing.
• The Romanian Naval Forces have failed to internalize the lesson of the Type 22 frigate procurement from the UK. When buying a used ship or a ship off the stocks, make sure that it is properly equipped with weapons and sensors, because subsequent opportunities to upgrade and modify the ship may not be forthcoming or may take longer than expected.
• Romania and Türkiye have good economic and strategic relations. Military technical cooperation between the two countries is increasing. However, Romanian authorities should carefully choose the areas of cooperation between the two countries. In the area of naval building, Romania and Türkiye are competitors, not partners.
• OPVs have already been produced in Romanian shipyards for the Romanian Border Police – Coast Guard and for the Pakistani Navy. The potential technology transfer of the Hisar class procurement is largely going to be redundant. Moreover, Romanian shipyards have unimpeded access to European and US weapons and technology as opposed to Turkish ones, that are sometimes subject to US or European sanctions because of Ankara’s diplomatic disputes with its allies.
• Türkiye has its own foreign policy agenda that may ran contrary to EU’s or NATO’s agendas. Furthermore, it has a particular relationship with the Russian Federation. At some point in time, following the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war, there is a risk that Ankara may choose to cooperate with Russia, to the detriment of other Black Sea states.

 

Recommendations

• Limit the Hisar class OPV procurement to one ship. The logistics and operational costs can be sustained;
• Re-evaluate the need for two extra OPVs for the Romanian Naval Forces;
• Acquire two new large multirole corvettes for the Romanian Naval Forces until 2030;
• Acquire a ship specialized in handling USVs, UUVs and/or UAVs (“drone mother-ship”) for patrolling the EEZ and for protecting the underwater and above-water infrastructure in the Black Sea;
• Develop an integrated surveillance and targeting system for the protection of Romania’s coastline and exclusive economic zone;
• In the future, avoid as much as possible, operational emergency procurements, which lead to an unbalanced fleet and few economic and industrial benefits;
• Review Romania’s participation in the European Patrol Corvette Program.

 

Annexes

Annex I: Technical file

Source: ASFAT / EDR

 

The first two ships of the Hisar class, Akhisar and Koçhisar, are heavily armed offshore patrol vessels and, on paper, are closer in capabilities to a multirole corvette than a regular OPV. The builder, ASFAT, classifies the Hisar class as an offshore patrol vessel according to the missions it was principally designed to perform^[175]:

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations 

• Search & Rescue (SAR) Operations
• Anti-Terrorism Operations
• Coastal and Offshore Patrol
• Maritime Special Operations
• Maritime Security
• Smuggling and piracy prevention

Secondary missions include^[176]:

• Naval Air Operations (utilizing the on-board helicopter)
• Electronic and acoustic warfare
• Naval Gunfire Support
• Combating asymmetrical threats
• Maritime transport protection
• Support and training within the scope of amphibious operations

In the Turkish Navy, the two Hisar class OPV are classified as patrol ships or OPVs and as such they have been assigned a pennant number that starts with the latter “P” which is reserved for fast attack craft and patrol craft. In contrast, the Ada class corvettes in service with the Turkish Navy have pennant numbers which begins with the letter “F” which is assigned to frigates also.

According to ASFAT, the ships are built on military naval standards and incorporate structural features that allow them to survive shocks generated by explosions, operate in high seas and withstand damage. This feature represents an asset because, usually, OPVs are built on civilian or mixed standards (civilian and military), in order to be cost effective, as they are not expected to fight with other enemy vessels. Furthermore, it is claimed that the ships have been designed with acoustic, infrared and radar signature reduction feature. It is not clear if these signature reduction features are an improvement over the current standard of the Ada class corvette or both classes of ships share the same features. It should be noted that the Turkish naval industry is not as experienced in stealth design as the French, German, UK or US naval industries. The MILGEM project, from which the Ada class corvette, the Hisar class OPV and the Istanbul class frigates (I-class) are derived, is the first major modern Turkish naval industry project.^[177]

Displacement is 2,300 tons which is line with a generic corvette available today. The ship’s dimensions are length of 99.5 m, beam of 14.4 m and draft of 3.77 m.^[178] These dimensions are similar to those of the Ada class corvette, though it appears that the Hisar class OPV is roughly 100 tons lighter in displacement.

Propulsion system: CODELOD (Combined Diesel-eLectric or Diesel), not the CODAG arrangement (Combined Diesel and Gas).

CODELOD is used both by OPVs and corvettes and, in theory, it should offer an advantage in ASW warfare, the electric motors ensuring a high degree of acoustic discretion, provided adequate sound and vibration dampening measures have been taken. However, the Hisar class OPVs are not meant to hunt for submarines in the Turkish Navy, a mission reserved for Ada class corvettes and Istanbul class frigates.

The new propulsion system has led to an increase in range of 1,000 nautical miles over the Ada class corvette, but a decrease in speed to 24 knots. This speed falls within the range of maximum speeds achieved by OPVs, but it is somewhat insufficient for the ships of this class to take part in national or allied surface action groups.

The Hissar class OPVs are the first Turkish ships equipped with CODELOD type propulsion system, but it is not clear if it is a locally designed system, or it is sourced from a foreign supplier. The diesel engines are MAN but the origin of the electric engines is not public.^[179] The reliability of the propulsion system is therefore unknown. The ships come with a full suite of NATO standard communications systems which include Link 11/16 and satellite communications.^[180]

Endurance is 21 days at sea, similar to that of a multirole corvette or a frigate, but there are OPVs that can achieve more.

The armament scheme of Hisar class OPV is based on the principle of Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW). The basic armament scheme of the Hisar class is a medium caliber naval gun (76 mm) and two heavy machine guns in remotely operated weapons stations.^[181] The ship has deck and hangar for a UAV and a 10-ton class helicopter, in the case of the Turkish Navy, for a S-70B Blackhawk naval helicopter. This baseline armament can be tailored according to mission, which can include a Close In Weapons System (CIWS), 8 ATMACA antiship missiles, 8 air-defense medium range missiles, 2 double torpedo launchers for lightweight antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes, an antisubmarine rocket launcher or alternatively a launcher for small guided munitions and anti-tank missiles and an integrated electronic warfare system.^[182]

 

Annex II: Comparison with other corvette classes in service

Hisar class OPV/ “light corvette” compared with other corvette classes in service

Ship Classes	Country	Displacement	Capabilities
Gowind / El Fateh[183]	Egypt (French license)	2,500-2,600 t	AAW 16 VLS for VL-MICA SHORAD Missiles ASuW 2 x 4 Exocet missiles 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara SuperRapid 2 x 1 Nexter 20 mm cannons ASW 2 x 3 324 mm torpedo launchers for MU 90 torpedoes 1 x 10 t naval helicopter
Sa’ar 6 (based on German Meko K130 design)[184]	Israel (built in Germany)	1,900 t	AAW: 32 VLS for Barak 8 air defense missiles; 40 VLS for C-Dome point defense system; ASuW: 16 Gabriel V anti-ship missiles; ASW: 2 x 2 torpedo launchers for 324 mm torpedoes; 1 x medium size (10 t) helicopter Artillery: 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara 2 x 25 mm Typhoon weapons stations
Braunschweig class[185]	Germany	1,840 t	AAW: 2 x RIM 116 RAM CIWS 2 x BK 27 mm CIWS ASuW: 2 x 2 RBS 15 Mk 3 34 naval mines Artillery: 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara Super Rapid
Hisar OPV	Türkiye	2,300 t	Baseline: Artillery: 1 x MKE 76 mm cannon 2 x 12,7 Browning machine guns; Aviation: 10 t helicopter deck and hangar; 1 UAV; Optional: AAW: 1 x 8 Hisar D air defense missiles; 1 x 35 mm Gökdeniz CIWS ASuW: 8 x Atmaca anti-ship missiles 1 x small guided munitions launcher: ASW 2 x 2 torpedo launchers for Orka 324 mm torpedoes; 1 x anti-submarine rocket launcher;
Hrabri[186] – Bulgaria	Germany	2,300 tons	AAW: 8 x MICA VL missiles 1 x 35 mm Rheinmetall Millenium CIWS ASuW: 2 x 2 RBS 15 Mk 3 ASW 2 x 2 torpedo launchers for AS 240 324 mm torpedoes

 

Annex III: Turkish MILGEM project derivatives

Class	Type	Country	Specifications and armament
Ada[187]	Corvette	Türkiye	Displacement: 2,400 t Dimensions: 99.56 x 14.40 x 3.90 m AAW: 1 x 21 RIM 116 RAM Block 1 missile launcher ASuW 2 x 4 ATMACA missile launchers 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara Super Rapid ASW 2×2 Mk. 32 torpedo launchers for 324 mm torpedoes 1 x S70 B Seahawk naval helicopter
Istif (I – class)[188]	Frigate	Türkiye	Displacement: 3,000 t Dimensions: 113.2 x 14.40 x 4.05 m AAW 16 x Hisar D SAM 1 x 35 mm Gokdeniz CIWS ASuW 16 x Atmaca anti-ship missiles 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara Super Rapid 2 x 1 25 mm automatic cannons in Aselsan STOP weapon stations ASW 2 x 2 324 mm ASW torpedo launchers 1 x S-70B
Hetman Ivan Mazepa[189]	Multirole corvette	Ukraine	Displacement: 2,300 t Dimensions: 99.56 x 14.40 x 3.90 m AAW: 8 x MICA VL missiles; 1 x 35 mm Gokdeniz CIWS; ASuW: 2 x 4 Harpoon missiles 1 x 76 mm Oto Melara Super Rapid ASW: 2 x 2 torpedo launchers for MU 90 324 mm torpedoes; 1 x 10 t helicopter
Babur[190]	Multirole corvette	Pakistan	Displacement: 3,000 t Dimensions: 108.8 x 14.8x 4.05 m AAW: 12 x CAMM-ER missiles 1 x Gokdeniz 35 mm CIWS ASuW 6 x P-282 antiship missiles 1x 76 mm Oto Melara SuperRapid 2 x 1 25 mm automatic cannons in Aselsan STOP weapon stations ASW 2 x 3 Mk 32 torpedo launchers for 324 torpedoes 1 x 10 t naval helicopter
Hisar	Offshore Patrol Vessel	Türkiye	Displacement: 2,300 t Dimensions: 99.56 x 14.42 x 3.77 m Baseline armament: Artillery: 1 x MKE 76 mm cannon 2 x 12,7 Browning machine guns Aselsan SMASH weapon stations; Aviation: 10 t helicopter deck and hangar; 1 UAV; Optional: AAW: 1 x 8 Hisar D air defense missiles; 1 x 35 mm Gökdeniz CIWS ASuW: 8 x Atmaca anti-ship missiles 1 x small guided munitions launcher: ASW 2 x 2 torpedo launchers for Orka 324 mm torpedoes; 1 x anti-submarine rocket launcher;

Source: STM

 

Of all the Turkish derivatives of the MILGEM the smallest and least well-armed derivative is the Hisar class OPV. However, this is in line with its role as an OPV, patrolling the Turkish EEZ in Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, it is clear that the export variants of the MILGEM project and the Istif/Istanbul class frigates are the best equipped vessels of the entire project. Considering the fact that there are five Istif class frigates being built at present for the Turkish Navy^[191], Romania could have requested and negotiated the purchase of one of these vessels “off the stocks” that could have been delivered in time “to protect” the Neptun Deep gas project, before it enters the production phase.

 

Annex IV: Romanian Hisar class OPV vs. similar Russian vessels deployed in Black Sea

Ship class	Country	Type	Specifications and Armament
Hisar	Romania	OPV	Displacement: 2,300 t Dimensions:99.56 x 14.42 x 3.77 m Baseline armament: Artillery: 1 x MKE 76 mm cannon 2 x 12,7 Browning machine guns in Unirobotics Targan weapon stations; Aviation: 10 t helicopter deck and hangar; 1 UAV (VTOL); Optional: AAW: 8 RIM-162 ESSM Block 2 1 x 35 mm Gökdeniz CIWS ASuW: 8 x NSM antiship missiles
Project 22160 (Vasily Bykov)[192]	Russia	OPV / Patrol Ship	Displacement: 1,700 / 1,965 t Dimensions: 94 x 14.2 x 4.2 m Baseline armament: Artillery: 1 x AK76 MA-01 76 mm cannon 2 x 1 14,5 mm MTPU machine guns Anti-saboteur weapons systems: 1 x DP-65 55 mm grenade launcher 2 x DP-64 45 mm grenade launcher Optional Weapons Modules: 1 x 3S90M Shtil-1 air defense missile system 9M331M – Tor M2 KM V/SHORAD missiles 3M24 – Kh-35 Uran anti-ship missiles 4 x Kalibr-NK land attack cruise missiles 9M331M – Tor M2 KM V/SHORAD missiles Paket-NK lightweight ASW torpedoes Aviation facilities: Landing deck for a Ka-27/29 Helix naval helicopter;
Steregushchiy (Project 20380)[193]	Russia	Multirole corvette	Displacement: 2,200 t Dimensions: 104.5 x 13 x 3.7 m Armament: AAW 1 x 12 Redut VLS with 9M100 medium range air-defense missiles (48 missiles) 2 x AK630M CIWS or 1 x Kashtan CIWS system ASuW 2×4 Kh-35 Uran anti-ship missiles 1 x A-190 Arsenal 100 mm 2 x 14.5 mm MTPU machine guns ASW 2×4 Paket-NK lightweight torpedoes Aviation facilities Landing deck and hangar 1 x K-27 Helix naval helicopter 1 x Orlan-10 UAV

Comparing the Romanian Hisar class OPV with the most similar type of ship in terms of role and capabilities in Russian service in the Black Sea, “on paper” the future Romanian vessel is more heavily armed and capable than the Russian Vasily Bykov OPV (Project 20380). The Russian OPV has the unique capability to launch tactical land attack cruise missiles if equipped with the appropriate weapons module. The Romanian OPV has an edge in air defense and anti-surface warfare. Russia has allocated a Steregushchiy class corvette to the Black Sea Fleet, but the ship hasn’t been deployed effectively in the Black Sea theater. Overall, the Russian ship has superior firepower, although it has a smaller displacement than the Hisar OPV. However, the quality and reliability of the Russian sensors and weapons systems may not be on par with the Romanian variation of the Hisar class OPV. If the Romanian vessel is equipped with Western sourced sensors, the edge against the Vasily Bykov class OPV increases, while it would prove dangerous for the Steregushchiy class corvette, in anti-surface warfare due to the NSM missiles.

 

FOOTNOTES

---

1. This author finds the distinction between light and heavy corvettes rather confusing. A more precise taxonomy should be “large” and “small” corvettes. The report is based entirely on open sources. ↑
2. TurDef Global Defence News, “Two OPVs TCG AKHİSAR and TCG KOÇHİSAR launched”, September 23, 2023, https://turdef.com/article/a-1?country=hisar+ ↑
3. O. Vasilescu, “Oficial: MApN plătește 300 milioane de euro pentru corveta din Turcia. Alte achiziții pentru Forțele Navale”, Euronews, April 22, 2025, https://www.euronews.ro/articole/oficial-ministerul-apararii-plateste-300-milioane-eu-pentru-corveta-din-turcia-se ↑
4. G. Marinescu, “Forţele Navale vor primi o corvetă din Turcia; ce misiuni poate îndeplini şi când ajunge în România”, April 23, 2025, https://www.bursa.ro/fortele-navale-vor-primi-o-corveta-din-turcia-ce-misiuni-poate-indeplini-si-cand-ajunge-in-romania-89564554. R. Caranfil, “Corveta de urgență națională: România se înarmează pe fugă și pe datorie”, Puterea, April 22, 2025, https://www.puterea.ro/corveta-de-urgenta-nationala-romania-se-inarmeaza-pe-fuga-si-pe-datorie ↑
5. TechRider, “Ministrul Apărării oferă noi informații despre nava Hisar realizată în Turcia: E la cheie și intră în dotarea Marinei Române anul viitor”, August 15, 2025, https://techrider.ro/defense/ministrul-apararii-ofera-noi-informatii-despre-nava-hisar-realizata-in-turcia-e-la-cheie-si-intra-in-dotarea-marinei-romane-anul-viitor/ ↑
6. Ministerul Apărării Naționale, “Vizita ministrului apărării naționale la Șantierele navale militare din Istanbul și Gölcük, Republica Turcia”, June 27, 2024, https://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/18472_vizita-ministrului-apararii-naționale-la-Șantierele-navale-militare-din-istanbul-și-golcuk,-republica-turcia ↑
7. A. Ibrahim, “An Overview of Contemporary Naval Vessels’ Categorization”, Modern Diplomacy, January 4, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/04/an-overview-of-contemporary-naval-vessels-categorization/ ↑
8. Ibid. ↑
9. Ibid. ↑
10. The idea of a “heavy corvette” has some tradition in the Romanian Naval Forces, though it hasn’t been operationally defined. For example, in 2015, it was expected that frigate Mărășești (F111) would be replaced with a “heavy corvette” by 2019 (IHS Janes Defence Weekly, February 2, 2015). ↑
11. Defence IQ Glossary, “Offshore Patrol Vessel”, https://www.defenceiq.com/glossary/offshore-patrol-vessel ↑
12. Commodore (Ret.) M. Cosentino, “OPVs in the Middle East: Requirements and Solutions” IQPC, 2013, https://www.iqpc.com/media/7504/12535.pdf, 1-4 ↑
13. R.D. Martinson, “East Asian Security in the Age of the Chinese Mega-Cutter”, July 3, 2025, https://cimsec.org/east-asian-security-age-chinese-mega-cutter/ ↑
14. A. Preston, The World’s Worst Ships, London: Conway Maritime Press, 2002, 171-183 ↑
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16. Army Recognition, “Russian Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate fires Kalibr missiles on Ukraine.”, April 11, 2022, https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-naval-defense/naval-defense-2022/russian-admiral-grigorovich-class-frigate-fires-kalibr-missiles-on-ukraine ↑
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26. Elbit Systems, “Elbit Systems Awarded $180 Million Purchase Order Under Framework Agreement to Supply First Three Watchkeeper X Tactical UAS to the Romanian Ministry of National Defense”, June 21, 2023, https://www.elbitsystems.com/news/elbit-systems-awarded-180-million-purchase-order-under-framework-agreement-supply-first-three ↑
27. Rheinmetall, “Rheinmetall and MBDA to develop high-energy laser effector system for the German Navy”, August 8, 2019, https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2019/2019-08-08_rheinmetall-and-mbda-to-develop-high-energy-laser-effector-system-for-the-german-navy ↑
28. Navy Lookout, “Up close with RFA Stirling Castle – first of the navy’s new motherships”, July 4, 2023, https://www.navylookout.com/up-close-with-rfa-stirling-castle-first-of-the-navys-new-motherships/ ↑
29. Naval Technology, “Construction begins on Qatari Emiri Navy’s first Doha-class corvette”, August 2, 2018, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/construction-begins-qatari-emiri-navys-first-doha-class-corvette/?utm_source=&utm_medium=15-30515&utm_campaign=&cf-view ↑
30. X. Vavasseur, “Fincantieri Delivers Qatar’s First Air Defense Corvette “Al Zubarah””, October 10, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/fincantieri-delivers-qatars-first-air-defense-corvette-al-zubarah/ ↑
31. A. Popa, “Noul ministru al Apărării, Moșteanu: Corveta ușoară turcească este o achiziție de care România are nevoie…”, TechRider, July 17, 2025, https://techrider.ro/defense/noul-ministru-al-apararii-mosteanu-corveta-usoara-turceasca-este-o-achizitie-de-care-romania-are-nevoie-nava-controversata-necesara-pentru-a-proteja-120-km-de-conducte-de-gaze-neptun-deep-128/G Marinescu, “Surse: “Dincolo de anunţurile oficiale, preţul real al corvetei turceşti va depăşi cu mult 300 milioane euro”, Bursa, April 30, 2025, https://www.bursa.ro/surse-dincolo-de-anunturile-oficiale-pretul-real-al-corvetei-turcesti-va-depasi-cu-mult-300-milioane-euro-89415559 ↑
32. Economedia, “OMV se așteaptă ca producția de gaze în cadrul proiectului Neptun Deep să înceapă în 2027”, April 30, 2025 https://economedia.ro/omv-se-asteapta-ca-productia-de-gaze-in-cadrul-proiectului-neptun-deep-sa-inceapa-in-2027.html ↑
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36. A. Tudor, “SURSE: România cumpără o corvetă din Turcia pentru că este mai ieftină și este furnizată „imediat””, Gândul, April 9, 2025, https://www.gandul.ro/politica/surse-romania-cumpara-o-corveta-din-turcia-pentru-ca-este-mai-ieftina-si-este-furnizata-imediat-20483664 ↑
37. R. Adm.(Ret.) C. Ciorobea, “Corveta ușoară, o soluție imediată de răspuns la provocările regionale”, Forumul Securității Maritime, May 5, 2025, https://www.forumulsecuritatiimaritime.ro/corveta-usoara-o-solutie-imediata-de-raspuns-la-provocarile-regionale/ ↑
38. M. Măndiță, “Prima navă de patrulare nouă ar putea intra în dotarea Forţelor Navale Române peste trei ani”, RRA, October 3, 2024, https://www.romania-actualitati.ro/stiri/romania/prima-nava-de-patrulare-noua-ar-putea-intra-in-dotarea-fortelor-navale-romane-peste-trei-ani-id199804.html ↑
39. O. Vasilescu, “Oficial: MApN plătește 300 milioane de euro pentru corveta din Turcia. Alte achiziții pentru Forțele Navale”, Euronews, April 22, 2025, https://www.euronews.ro/articole/oficial-ministerul-apararii-plateste-300-milioane-eu-pentru-corveta-din-turcia-se ↑
40. X. Vavsseur, “Pakistan Navy Commissions Second Yarmook-class Corvette”, Naval News, November 13, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/pakistan-navy-commissions-second-yarmook-class-corvette/ ↑
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42. V. Cozmei, “INTERVIU „Drone pe toate planurile”. Șeful Marinei detaliază noua strategie a României. „O schimbare majoră” / Lecțiile învățate din războiul din Ucraina”, Hotnews, July 31, 2025, https://hotnews.ro/strategie-fortele-navale-la-marea-neagra-viceamiral-mihai-panait-2034413. F. Jipa, “România achiziţionează prima navă de luptă nouă, după 35 de ani de aşteptare”, MAS, July 29, 2025, https://monitorulapararii.ro/romania-achizitioneaza-prima-nava-de-lupta-noua-dupa-35-de-ani-de-asteptare-1-58654 ↑
43. The Romanian Navy, with the exception of the Frigate Flotilla and the Mihail Kogălniceanu Flotilla, uses the term “divizion” to describe its units, such as “Divizionul 50 Corvete”. The author opted to use “squadron” to translate this term, not the English naval term “division”. The reason for this choice is that similar sized units in NATO navies are described as “squadrons” and to avoid confusion between the naval division and the army division, which describes a different sort of military unit. ↑
44. G. Marinescu, “Ciolacu îngroapă corvetele lui Dăncilă: Forţele Navale rămân fără vasele de luptă”, Bursa, March 15, 2024, https://www.bursa.ro/ciolacu-ingroapa-corvetele-lui-dancila-fortele-navale-raman-fara-vasele-de-lupta-25621251 ↑
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51. Global Defence News TurDef “Next Hisar-class OPVs Receive VLS and a New Superstructure”, February 21, 2025, https://www.turdef.com/article/next-hisar-class-opvs-receive-vls-and-a-new-superstructure ↑
52. Global Defence News TurDef, “Romania Might Buy a Hisar-class Offshore Patrol Vessel”, March 30, 2025, https://turdef.com/article/romania-might-buy-a-hisar-class-offshore-patrol-vessel ↑
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166. Turkish Minute, “Turkey does not want US or NATO presence in the Black Sea: navy commander”, November 18, 2023, https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/11/18/turkey-does-want-us-nato-presence-the-black-sea-navy-commander/ ↑
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173. Administrația Prezidențială, “Declarația de presă susținută de Președintele interimar al României, Ilie Bolojan, la finalul ședinței Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării”, April 30, 2025, https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/declaratia-de-presa-sustinuta-de-presedintele-interimar-al-romaniei-ilie-bolojan-la-finalul-sedintei-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii ↑
174. I. Grecea, “De la Daewoo la Damen și acum Desan. Șantierul din Mangalia primește colacul de salvare de la turci”, Economedia.ro, April 1, 2025, https://economedia.ro/de-la-daewoo-la-damen-si-acum-desan-santierul-din-mangalia-primeste-colacul-de-salvare-de-la-turci.html ↑
175. ASFAT, “Offshore Patrol Vessel”, https://cdn.asfat.com.tr/catalogs/ASFAT%20ADKG%20Off-Shore%20Patrol%20Vessel.pdf. Overtdefense.com., “Turkey’s First Hisar Class OPV TCG Akhisar Starts Sea Trials”, December 18, 2024, https://www.overtdefense.com/2024/12/18/turkeys-first-hisar-class-opv-tcg-akhisar-starts-sea-trials/ ↑
176. Overtdefense.com, “Turkey’s First Hisar Class OPV TCG Akhisar Starts Sea Trials”, December 18, 2024, https://www.overtdefense.com/2024/12/18/turkeys-first-hisar-class-opv-tcg-akhisar-starts-sea-trials/ ↑
177. B. Nugent, “The MILGEM Program: Turkish Naval Procurement and Exports”, ESD, May 31, 2023, https://euro-sd.com/2023/05/articles/31367/the-milgem-programme-turkish-naval-procurement-and-exports/ ↑
178. T. Ozberk, “Turkiye’s first indigenous Hisar-class OPV starts sea trials”, December 13, 2024, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/turkiyes-first-indigenous-hisar-class-opv-starts-sea-trials/ ↑
179. EDR Magazine, “ASFAT’s latest naval solution: the Hisar class OPVs”, November 27, 2023, https://www.edrmagazine.eu/asfats-latest-naval-solution-the-hisar-class-opvs ↑
180. Ibid. ↑
181. Security News, “Dotările corvetei Forţelor Navale Române achiziţionată din Turcia”,October 2, 2025, https://securitynews.ro/dotarile-corvetei-fortelor-navale-romane-achizitionata-din-turcia/. Y. E. Ișik, “Romania to finalize Turkish OPV deal in November”, October 4, 2025, https://en.defenceturk.net/romania-to-finalize-turkish-opv-deal-in-november/ ↑
182. EDR Magazine, “ASFAT’s latest naval solution: the Hisar class OPVs”, November 27, 2023, https://www.edrmagazine.eu/asfats-latest-naval-solution-the-hisar-class-opvs¹⁸³ N. Gain, “Egyptian Navy Commissions First Locally Built El Fateh-class Corvette”, Naval News, January 7, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/01/egyptian-navy-commissions-first-locally-built-el-fateh-class-corvette/ ↑
183. ↑
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185. Armyrecognition.com, “K130 Braunschweig class”, August 9, 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/military-products/navy/corvettes/k130-braunschweig-class ↑
186. T. Grotnik, “Bulgaria’s Second MMPV Launched by Local Shipyard”, Naval News, December 16, 2024, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/bulgarias-second-mmpv-launched-by-local-shipyard/ ↑
187. D-Mitch, “Ada class corvettes of the Turkish Navy”, Naval Analyses, June 15 2015, https://www.navalanalyses.com/2015/06/ada-class-corvettes-of-turkish-navy.html ↑
188. E. Wertheim, “MILGEM Evolution: The Istanbul-class Turkish National Frigate”, Proceedings, October 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/october/milgem-evolution-istanbul-class-turkish-national-frigate ↑
189. T. Ozberk, “Latest on Ukraine’s first corvette ‘Hetman Ivan Mazepa’”, Naval News, July 9, 2024, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/07/latest-on-ukraines-first-corvette-hetman-ivan-mazepa/ ↑
190. Baird Maritime, “Babur – Pakistan Navy corvette to take on air defence and surface warfare missions”, July 16, 2024, https://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/naval/naval-ships/vessel-review-babur-pakistan-navy-corvette-to-take-on-air-defence-and-surface-warfare-missions ↑
191. T. Ozberk, “Anadolu Shipyard lays keel of 5th I-class frigate for Turkish Navy”, Naval News, January 21, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/anadolu-shipyard-lays-keel-of-5th-i-class-frigate-for-turkish-navy/ ↑
192. Russianships.info, “Patrol Ship Project 22160”, https://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_22160.htm ↑
193. Naval Technology, “Project 20380 Steregushchy Class Corvettes”, February 19, 2013, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/steregushchy-class/. E. Wertheim, “Russia’s Steregushchiy-class Frigates”, Proceedings, January 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/russias-steregushchiy-class-frigates ↑