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The new normal: weak states and failed megacities

The analysis^[1] magnifies on megatrends manifest at global level that are shaping our world, and points to a future where overpopulation, urbanization and governance failure can converge and create ungovernable postmodern slums, where the absence of basic public goods and constant competition for scare resources creates more global insecurity, new threats and a perfect breading ground for extremists and insurgency. Several megacities in Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh are showcased as examples of accelerated urban population growth that can stress and further erode an urban infrastructure already under duress. Against this setting, energy and water demand can overwhelm supply and add further layers of conflict, testing like never before the viability of the basic cell of the international system: the Westphalian state.

The current security landscape is populated with both more classical geopolitical challenges (a revival of Russian revisionism in Europe, a diffuse threat generated by a rising China to the East Asia territorial status-quo), but also with less traditional ones, most of them specific to the post Cold War age and associated with threats emanating from inside the states. Today, what we call the failed states phenomenon is an established reality of the post 9/11 international system. To some extent, the weak and fragile states are increasingly becoming the new normal: “while the central problem of international relations in the 20th century was states that were too strong (Germany or Soviet Union), the primary problems of international relations in the 21st century are states that are too weak (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico).”^[2] In fact, this is a conclusion validated by the statistics of the post Cold War era that shows that “77% of all international crises involved one weak state”.^[3]

Interstate vs. Internal conflicts

Failed states provide the ideal safe havens and incubators for non-state forces that increasingly have the power to tear apart the fabric of regional orders. Although initially received with hope and enthusiasm as an inexorable march of liberty and democracy, the Arab Spring accelerated a trend where the foundational pillars of the Westphalian framework are not only under siege, but they have already started to crumble. Any of the following examples is enough to make the point:

• Libya, heralded as a success role model of future interventionism, became a messy highly unstable place that forced Washington to evacuate their Ambassador;
• Mali, in light of the spillover from Libya, triggered an emergency French mission to stabilize the country; or
• the collapse of the border between Syria and Iraq, where a new informal entity (ISIL-Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) is on the rise.

In many of these cases it is not an exaggeration to say that, what we are increasingly starting to see is a world populated with failed regions where “the borders created post-WWI or post WWII do not exist for many people anymore.”^[4]

Looking at the surrounding security environment from the position of a professional intelligence officer, General Michael Flynn, director of U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency^[5], emphasized in a series of farewell interviews that “what I see each day is the most uncertain, chaotic and confused international environment that I’ve witnessed in my entire career of 33 years.”^[6] First of all, one sees a world where there is a failure of nation states and a failure of governance triggered by groups that are orchestrating and speculating the political and economical grievances of the disenfranchised and dissatisfied youth bulge in pivotal regions (Africa, Middle East, South Asia):

“I think we’re in a period of prolonged societal conflict that is pretty unprecedented. In the Middle East, we’re starting to see issues arise over boundaries that were drawn back in the post-colonial era following World War I. In some regions, we’re seeing the failure of the nation-state, and to some degree the disintegration of the [Westphalian] system of nation-states. (…) What I see is a strategic landscape and boundaries on the global map changing right before our eyes.”^[7]

In the words of a great statesman of the XX century and a core realist, the former National Security Advisor of the George H.W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, this is an assault on the world as we know it: “I think we are facing another seminal change. But to me, it’s of a very different character than the one faced with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. And the change is, in a way, a quiet assault on the Westphalian nation-state system that has been for 500 years the be-all, the end-all.”^[8]

Arab Spring as a snapshot of the future: emerging global trends

If anyone wants to understand the future, one needs to take a closer look at the causal forces that are behind the societal set-up of the Arab Spring. There is an emerging consensus that a mix of urbanization, disaffected young populations living in under stress urban environments without enough economic opportunities, in the context of a demographic boom with increased connectivity and ability to network generated a tsunami pressure on the effectiveness of the status-quo to deliver. As David Kilcullen put it, “the three most heavily coastline urbanized countries of the Arab Spring were Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. It is a strong connection between rapid urban growth, overstressing of urban systems and population growth, particularly youth bulge, between that kind of demographic change and the sort of conflict that we saw in the Arab Spring”.^[9] But as we move forward to a more urbanized and populated world, it is more likely that the structural conditions that fueled and enabled the Arab Spring proliferate: “we are likely to experience more of the kinds of rebellions and insurgencies that have marked the Arab Spring”.^[10]

The most recent report (2012) of U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) focusing on global tendencies – “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” – listed a set of emerging mega-trends that have the potential to shake the world as we know it and create a societal set-up conducive to reproduce the variables that enabled the Arab Spring. These key trends are:

Rise of the individual: The first one that we’ve seen in action during the Arab Spring is the empowerment of the individual. The essence of it is not only related to the rising of a global middle class able to buy and consume more, and at the same time to press the governments for more accountability, but also about the disruption of the classical state monopoly. In short, “individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies (particularly precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments, and bioterror weaponry), enabling them to perpetrate large-scale violence—a capability formerly [known as] the monopoly of states”.^[11]

Sunset of the Westphalian framework: A second mega-trend, closely linked to the first one, is the dispersion, the diffusion and migration of power. It is not only a geographical tendency, from the West to the rising East, from the Euro-Atlantic world to the Indo-Pacific region, but a slow motion eroding the traditional Westphalian state in favor of non-state actors (individuals, communities, cities, networks). This particular phenomenon has huge implications from the perspective of the states’ ability to respond and counteract future threats. In his latest book, The End of Power, Moises Naim^[12] describes the essence of the problem more as some sort of mutation, a shifting, a pivoting away from the traditional big players (Big Business, Big Government) to new more adaptive and effective small social entities: “the decoupling of power from size, and thus the decoupling of the capacity to use power effectively from the control of a large Weberian bureaucracy, is changing the world”.^[13] At the same time, compared with the past when the agricultural and industrial revolutions reordered the international system by structurally consolidating the Westphalian state, today the information revolution is reshaping the power of the traditional state in a way that gives non-state actors the ability to compete with its conventional Weberian portfolio.^[14]

Boom of megacities and slums: The third mega-trend that will structurally reshape the world in which we live in is the nexus between population growth and urbanization. The world population increased exponentially from 750 million people (at the beginning of the industrial revolution, in 1750) to 3 billion people (in 1960) to roughly 7 billion people today. The data shows that until 2050 the planet will need to accommodate another 2.5 billion people, almost the same number of people that the world generated up until 1960.^[15] The problem is that this increase in population will happen in urban environments concentrated mainly in the coastlines of low income countries – Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, South East Asia – in fact, regions that are the least prepared (from a governance infrastructure perspective) to absorb such huge influx of people and “regions that already face the greatest economic, social and political risks”.^[16]

Population boom

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

At the same time, the world is becoming more urbanized. In 2030, it is estimated that around 60% of the global population (around 4.9 billion) will live in cities.^[17] Regionally, the highest rate of urban growth will happen in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, spaces that are recording also the highest population growth rates. In this context it is expected that the Sub-Saharan Africa population will double by 2040.^[18] Beyond China and India, around 26% of the urban growth will be generated by countries like Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan.^[19]

 An urban planet

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The majority of population and urban growth (by 2040, 65% of people are likely to live in urban areas^[20]) will be preponderantly clustered in the developing world^[21], especially in Africa and Asia. At the same time, a significant part of the urban expansion will happen in packed, highly congested shanty towns and slum areas with their population “doubling to around 2 billion by 2040”.^[22] It is estimated that by 2030 there will be “16 additional megacities^[23]—mostly in developing countries in Africa and south Asia”^[24] beyond Karachi, Lagos and Dhaka.

A world of failed megacities?

The interaction and the simultaneous aggregation, in some parts of the world, of all these megatrends might affect decisively the patterns of conflict and rebellions. In the end, these are not causative mechanisms in themselves, but they should be perceived more as environmental enablers and accelerators of conflict and instability. It is more likely to see uprisings when these mega-trends converge simultaneously in one point and the capacity of local governance mechanisms to manage these increasing challenges and demands is eroding. A short virtual trip in some of the pivotal megacities that in the near future will absorb a huge amount of inhabitants might give us a taste of the future challenges.

• Karachi and Lahore (Pakistan). In the post 9/11 world, Pakistan remained for much of the decade a key actor on the frontlines of the war against terrorism. Today, Pakistan remains vital in helping stabilizing Afghanistan by controlling its own territory especially the tribal belt (the FATA region), the safe haven of Al Qaeda Central and their supporters, the Pakistani Taliban. As we move forward, the challenges will go far beyond managing the challenges of insurgency in FATA. By 2025, half of the population will live in cities. By the same year the population of the two largest cities in the country (Karachi and Lahore) is expected to boom: Karachi’s population will rise from 12 million (in 2007) to 20 million (in 2025) and Lahore’s from 7 to 10 million.^[25]

The transformation of Karachi

The challenges on the local governance mechanisms are already huge. For example, in Karachi the local authorities were unable to regulate the land use in the city. If this reality will continue, “more than 10 million people will be living in illegal settlements”^[26], in other words in “unregulated and undergoverned slums”^[27], packed with millions of poor people, in desperate need of public services. The worst consequence is local authorities unable to respond to the needs of the people: providing food, education, public security, clinics, jobs. They are already swamped by the current needs and they fail to provide minimal basic services. The slums of Karachi and Lahore are becoming each day “the functional equivalent of refugee camps”.^[28] In the 2014 Fragile States Index developed by the Fund for Peace, Pakistan ranked 10^th being placed in the high alert category.^[29] From the perspective of group alienation, Pakistan has recorded a maximum value of 10 while Afghanistan only 8.7.

• Lagos (Nigeria). For the past year, Nigeria made headlines because of the fierce governance contest between the formal authorities and the Boko Haram group (a well known Al-Qaeda affiliate). But the governance challenges go far beyond the Boko Haram insurgency. Lagos’ population is expected to grow to 25 million by 2025.^[30] In the meantime the city is becoming an anarchical paradise: “street gangs, ethnic and religious militias, and criminals have virtual free rein in much of the city”. Moreover, the infrastructure for providing public services (sanitation, housing, medical facilities) is crumbling.^[31] Police and law enforcement is high on demand, but very short on supply. In the 2014 Fragile States Index developed each year by the Fund for Peace, Nigeria ranked 17^th, in the alert category.^[32] In terms of effectiveness of providing public services, Nigeria fares like Afghanistan, but from the alienation of different groups in the society perspective, Nigeria is even worse than Afghanistan.

• Dhaka (Bangladesh). As the world fastest growing megacity^[33] (the city grew by 5,700% between 1950 and 2015, from 400,000 to almost 23 million people), Dhaka already suffers from huge pressures on a failing urban infrastructure. With each passing year Dhaka receives an input of around 400,000 new migrants.^[34] Moreover, the rise of the level of the sea will make sure that the influx of people continues to grow. Many of the basic services that in the modern cities of the Western world are taken for granted (consistent electricity, drinkable water, reliable sanitation), cannot keep the pace with a constantly increasing demand in Dhaka. Statistics shows that “nearly two-thirds of the sewage in the megacity of Dhaka is untreated”.^[35] The broader national indicators are also not very optimistic.

The transformation of Dhaka

Poverty remains a huge challenge because almost “70 percent of Dhaka households earn less than $170 (U.S.) a month”.^[36] In the 2014 Fragile States Index, Bangladesh ranked 29^th in the alert category.^[37] In terms of alienation of constitutive groups of society, Bangladesh has values very close to Afghanistan while in terms of providing public services, Bangladesh fares a bit better (indicator of 8.4), but still close to Afghanistan (indicator of 9.0).

 

 

 

 

 

To conclude, a more urbanized world is not just good news about progress or about more opportunities. A more urbanized world in places where the Westphalian structure is already under siege means also a story about the proliferation of the slum areas that can provide a safe haven for the dark elements of globalization. It is the specter of a new world where terrorists, criminal gangs and insurgencies can merge and mix in creative combinations ready to speculate the weaknesses of the local governance apparatus. Step by step, hybridity (the convergence of the criminal activities in the global arena) is becoming an established reality of the security environment:

“the Colombian FARC, the Somali Pirates, Karachi’s mobs, some of the Indian Gangs, AQIM in Mali and Niger, the Mexican Cartels are all now military forces that are not only using revolutionary taxation for political purposes, but indeed hybrids or mutants; and above all criminals.(…) Their territories are expanding from lawless marginal neighborhoods to anarchic megacities and liberated territories.”^[38]

The absence of opportunities, failing urban infrastructures, coupled with the inability of local governments to take care of their own populations through the provision of basic services might push the slum inhabitants to extremism. These postmodern slums, decoupled from the formal order and from decent public services, are increasingly becoming (from the perspective of the public administrator) the new lost neighborhoods, the new ungoverned territories. History shows that, when the state is unable to control its territory, including the urban peripheries, other actors will compete for control and ultimately step in to fill the vacuum: “a state that can no longer control its borders and its territory can become a haven for criminal groups, a transit platform for trafficking, or a rear-guard base where terrorist groups can plan action on a large scale. These activities fuel crime and rebel movements in the areas where they develop.”^[39] In the absence of a public Leviathan, it is not inconceivable that slum populations will search for other options. A weak government presence in the new “peri-urban” areas will incentivize the emergence of criminal networks or non-state armed groups that will compete for the support of the local angry youth: “in these pockets of destitution, often devoid of the institutional frameworks necessary for effective governance and rule of law, they are ripe for recruitment and radicalization by internal dissidents and violent non‐state actors.”^[40]

Historically, a weak overwhelmed state capacity (as is the case of a slum area) is correlated with the presence of insurgency: “insurgencies are most likely to occur in low-capacity states because financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments are less likely to prevent nascent opposition from becoming a viable insurgency.”^[41] All these suggest that the tendency recorded in the first decade of the 21^st tendency – “the failure of many States to exercise the basic functions of sovereignty is a lasting, widespread phenomenon”^[42] – is likely to be replicated in the megacities of the developing world as more people migrate from the rural areas to urban settings increasing the pressures on an already stressed governance infrastructure.

Energy and water

The last piece of the puzzle in terms of future mega-trends is the energy component. The states where the expansion of population and urbanization occur are more likely to expect a significant increase in demand for resources. The migration of populations from rural to urban settings is the key driving factor in the massively expanding demand for energy in the non-OECD world where by 2040, around “60% of residents will live in urban settings, up from 30 percent in 1980”.^[43] Overall, urban areas will account for 75% of the total energy demand.^[44] Beyond urbanization, the increase in population will also massively expand the number of households in the entire world (from 1.9 billion in 2010 to 2.8 billion by 2040).^[45] By some estimates, global energy demand will rise by 35% over the next 30 years^[46] and, by others, the demand is likely to grow by more than half.^[47] Still, fossil fuels are likely to remain the dominant energy choice in the developing world, especially in Africa where half of the 1.3 billion people that don’t have access to electricity and “one-quarter of the 2.6 billion people relying on the traditional use of biomass for cooking” live.^[48] Overall, the major implication of these trends is that the challenge of the future is about “meeting the demand growth of a growing world”.^[49]

But the challenges of the future are not only about generating more energy but also about how to change consumption patterns and create smart frameworks for reducing energy demand. This latter objective will require significant investments in creating energy efficient ways and means for managing the megacities: “solar and thermal energies, energy from bio-mass, recycling of waste, wind farms, LED street and building lightning, reduction of distribution and transmission losses, development of smart grids smart instrumentation (new batteries and transformers, low voltage networks, etc.), smart lighting.”^[50] In the end, the choice is between chaotic ad-hoc development that might preserve the status-quo (“sprawling mobility needs, highly inefficient energy consumption and large slums”^[51]) and a smart approach based on development of urban infrastructure that integrates transportation, energy, water and waste systems in order to create more energy-efficient cities.^[52] The costs of developing the right infrastructure for absorbing the 21^st century urban migrant waves will be high and would require the “development equivalent to a new city of one million people every week for the next 30 years”.^[53]

Another important variable that will shape the stability of an increasing urban world will be the water demand. Recent simulations showed that Middle East followed by India will experience massive water shortages in the next decades and in many places policy makers will be forced to make choices and trade-offs “between agricultural and energy needs for water”, a scenario that may increase the instability patterns in “already sensitive countries”.^[54]

Global water trends

 

Conclusion

The global mega-trends point out to a security environment where population growth, the huge influxes of people from rural to urban settings in some key parts of the developing world (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) and a networked environment, will increase the demand for scarce resources at a time when the effectiveness of Westphalian structures to deliver basic public services is clearly under assault. All these are likely to increase the insurgent disaffection of core societal groups and empower them to challenge the status quo. Such trends “point to a future dominated by chaotic local insecurity”^[55] and to an age of prolonged societal conflict. Overall, “as more people flood these urban agglomerations, energy demands overwhelm infrastructure and water requirements exceed supply, creating an overstressed life‐support infrastructure and, eventually, conflict over basic human needs”.^[56]

 

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FOOTNOTES:

1. This brief draws and further builds upon ideas introduced in the chapter “The forthcoming age of urban insurgency: ways to counteract” authored by Octavian Manea and published in Democracy and Security in the 21^st century: Perspectives on a Changing World, Edited by Valentin Naumescu, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pp. 286-317. ↑
2. Interview with John Nagl, “COIN is not dead”, Small Wars Journal, February 2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-is-not-dead ↑
3. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 73. ↑
4. Interview with Lieutenant General Mike Flynn, director of U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, PRISM, Vol. 4, No. 4, http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Interview_LTG_Mike_Flynn_Corrected.pdf ↑
5. Created in the early 1960s, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) combat support agency. DIA produces, analyzes, and disseminates military intelligence information to combat and non-combat military missions. DIA serves as the primary U.S. manager and producer of foreign military intelligence and is central to the activity of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Unified Combatant Command. ↑
6. James Kitfield, Flynn’s last interview: iconoclast departs DIA with a warning, Breaking Defense, August 7^th, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/flynns-last-interview-intel-iconoclast-departs-dia-with-a-warning/ ↑
7. Idem. ↑
8. Global trends 2030: Luncheon with Brent Scowcroft, Atlantic Council, December 2012, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/global-trends-2030-luncheon-with-brent-scowcroft-transcript ↑
9. David Kilcullen, “Out of the Mountains: the coming age of the urban guerrilla”, speech at the New America Foundation, September 18^th, 2013, Washington D.C., http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/out_of_the_mountains ↑
10. John A. Nagl, Knife Fights. An education in modern war, The Penguin Press, New York, 2014, p. 226. ↑
11. “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds”, a publication of the National Intelligence Council, December 2012, p. 3. ↑
12. Moisés Naím is an internationally-syndicated columnist and best-selling author of influential books including the recently-published The End of Power, a startling examination of how power is changing across all sectors of society. He was editor of Foreign Policy Magazine during 1996-2010. In the early 1990s, Dr. Naím served as Venezuela’s Minister of Trade and Industry, as director of Venezuela’s Central Bank, and as executive director of the World Bank.  ↑
13. Moises Naim, The end of power-from boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, why being in charge isn’t what it used to be (New York: Basic Books, 2013) 52. ↑
14. John A. Nagl, Knife Fights. An education in modern war, The Penguin Press, New York, 2014, p. 222. ↑
15. David Kilcullen, “Out of the Mountains: the coming age of the urban guerrilla”, speech at the New America Foundation, September 18^th, 2013, Washington D.C., http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/out_of_the_mountains ↑
16. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 95. ↑
17. “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds”, p. 26. ↑
18. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 95. ↑
19. Idem. ↑
20. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 99. ↑
21. Ibidem, p. 27. ↑
22. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 99. ↑
23. The common measure by which an urban area is considered a megacity is a city with a population larger than 10 million. ↑
24. Joel Kotkin, “Welcome to the billion-man slum”, in The Daily Beast, August 25^th, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/25/welcome-to-the-billion-man-slum.html ↑
25. P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, “Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future. The Real Population Bomb”, Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2012, Chapter 5: The most dangerous place. Karachi, Lahore, and the Rural Areas, e-book version, location 1270-1279. ↑
26. Ibidem, location 1319. ↑
27. Ibidem, location 1376. ↑
28. Idem. ↑
29. Fragile State Index 2014, p.4, http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf ↑
30. P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, “Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future. The Real Population Bomb”, Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2012, Chapter 6: Oil, guns and corpses. Lagos and Kinshasa, e-book version, location 1668. ↑
31. Ibidem, location 1638. ↑
32. Fragile State Index 2014, p.4, http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf ↑
33. P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, “Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future. The Real Population Bomb”, Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2012, Chapter 8: The most vulnerable megacity. Drowning in Dhaka, e-book version, location 2262. ↑
34. Joel Kotkin,”Welcome to the billion-man slum”, in The Daily Beast, August 25^th, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/25/welcome-to-the-billion-man-slum.html ↑
35. Idem. ↑
36. Idem. ↑
37. Fragile State Index 2014, p.4, http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf ↑
38. Alain Bauer, “Hybridization of conflicts”, in PRISM vol. 4, No. 4, 2014, pp. 65-66, http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Hybridization_of_Conflicts.pdf ↑
39. 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, p. 38. ↑
40. Preface by Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) to “Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm”, an anthology by Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger, p. 9, April 2014, http://kalevleetaru.com/Publish/Understanding-Megacities-Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Intelligence.pdf ↑
41. Seth G. Jones & Patrick B. Johnston, “The Future of Insurgency”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2013, p. 4. ↑
42. 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, p. 38. ↑
43. Exxon Mobil, the 2014 “Outlook for Energy. A view to 2040”, p. 3. ↑
44. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 106. ↑
45. Exxon Mobil, “The Outlook for Energy. A view to 2040”, 2014, p. 5. ↑
46. Ibidem, p. 8. ↑
47. UK Ministry of Defense, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040, 4^th Edition, January 2010, p. 106. ↑
48. Executive Summary of World Energy Outlook 2013, International Energy Agency, p. 1. ↑
49. Daniel Yergin, Vice Chairman, HIS, quoted in ExxonMobil, “The Outlook for Energy. A view to 2040”, 2014, p. 14. ↑
50. Megacities, European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET), pp. 3-4, ↑
51. “Signals and Signposts”, Shell energy Scenarios to 2050, p. 38. ↑
52. Idem. ↑
53. Idem. ↑
54. Marc Imhoff, Jill Brandenberger, Katherine Calvin, James Edmonds, Kathy Hibbard, Mohamad Hejazi, Allison Thomson and Leon Clarke, “Evaluating Long‐Term Threats to Environmental Security via Integrated Assessment Modeling of Changes in Climate, Population, Land Use, Energy, and Policy” in Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm, an anthology by Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger , p. 17, April 2014, http://kalevleetaru.com/Publish/Understanding-Megacities-Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Intelligence.pdf ↑
55. John A. Nagl, Knife Fights. An education in modern war, The Penguin Press, New York, 2014, p. 237. ↑
56. Preface by Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) to “Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm”, an anthology by Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger, p. 9, April 2014, http://kalevleetaru.com/Publish/Understanding-Megacities-Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Intelligence.pdf ↑